Institutions as the fundamental cause of long-run growth by Acemoglu, Daron et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
INSTITUTIONS AS THE FUNDAMENTAL
CAUSE OF LONG-RUN GROWTH
Daron Acemoglu
Simon Johnson
James Robinson
Working Paper 10481
http://www.nber.org/papers/w10481
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
May 2004
Prepared for the Handbook of Economic Growth edited by Philippe Aghion and Steve Durlauf. We thank the
editors for their patience and Leopoldo Fergusson, Pablo Querubín and Barry Weingast for their helpful
suggestions. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the National
Bureau of Economic Research.
©2004 by Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson. All rights reserved. Short sections of text,
not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including
© notice, is given to the source. 
Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth
Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson
NBER Working Paper No. 10481
May 2004
JEL No. N11, N13, N15, N16, N17, O10, P10, P17
ABSTRACT
This paper develops the empirical and theoretical case that differences in economic institutions are
the fundamental cause of differences in economic development. We first document the empirical
importance of institutions by focusing on two "quasi-natural experiments" in history, the division
of Korea into two parts with very different economic institutions and the colonization of much of
the world by European powers starting in the fifteenth century. We then develop the basic outline
of a framework for thinking about why economic institutions differ across countries. Economic
institutions determine the incentives of and the constraints on economic actors, and shape economic
outcomes. As such, they are social decisions, chosen for their consequences. Because different
groups and individuals typically benefit from different economic institutions, there is generally a
conflict over these social choices, ultimately resolved in favor of groups with greater political power.
The distribution of political power in society is in turn determined by political institutions and the
distribution of resources. Political institutions allocate de jure political power, while groups with
greater economic might typically possess greater de facto political power. We therefore view the
appropriate theoretical framework as a dynamic one with political institutions and the distribution
of resources as the state variables. These variables themselves change over time because prevailing
economic institutions affect the distribution of resources, and because groups with de facto political
power today strive to change political institutions in order to increase their de jure political power
in the future. Economic institutions encouraging economic growth emerge when political institutions
allocate power to groups with interests in broad-based property rights enforcement, when they create
effective constraints on power-holders, and when there are relatively few rents to be captured by
power-holders. We illustrate the assumptions, the workings and the implications of this framework
using a number of historical examples.
Daron Acemoglu James Robinson
Department of Economics Departments of Economics and Political Science
MIT University of California, Berkeley
50 Memorial Drive Berkeley, CA  94720
Cambridge, MA  02142
and NBER
daron@mit.edu
Simon Johnson
Sloan School of Management
MIT
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, MA  02142
and NBER
sjohnson@mit.edu
1 Introduction
1.1 The question
The most trite yet crucial question in the field of economic growth and development
is: Why are some countries much poorer than others? Traditional neoclassical growth
models, following Solow (1956), Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965), explain diﬀerences
in income per capita in terms of diﬀerent paths of factor accumulation. In these models,
cross-country diﬀerences in factor accumulation are due either to diﬀerences in saving
rates (Solow), preferences (Cass-Koopmans), or other exogenous parameters, such as
total factor productivity growth. More recent incarnations of growth theory, following
Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988), endogenize steady-state growth and technical progress,
but their explanation for income diﬀerences is similar to that of the older theories. For
instance, in the model of Romer (1990), a country may be more prosperous than an-
other if it allocates more resources to innovation, but what determines this is essentially
preferences and properties of the technology for creating ‘ideas’.1
Though this theoretical tradition is still vibrant in economics and has provided many
insights about the mechanics of economic growth, it has for a long time seemed unable to
provide a fundamental explanation for economic growth. As North and Thomas (1973, p.
2) put it: “the factors we have listed (innovation, economies of scale, education, capital
accumulation etc.) are not causes of growth; they are growth” (italics in original).
Factor accumulation and innovation are only proximate causes of growth. In North and
Thomas’s view, the fundamental explanation of comparative growth is diﬀerences in
institutions.
What are institutions exactly? North (1990, p. 3) oﬀers the following definition:
“Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly
devised constraints that shape human interaction.” He goes on to emphasize the key
implications of institutions since, “In consequence they structure incentives in human
exchange, whether political, social, or economic.”
Of primary importance to economic outcomes are the economic institutions in soci-
ety such as the structure of property rights and the presence and perfection of markets.
Economic institutions are important because they influence the structure of economic
1Although some recent contributions to growth theory emphasize the importance of economic poli-
cies, such as taxes, subsidies to research, barriers to technology adoption and human capital policy, they
typically do not present an explanation for why there are diﬀerences in these policies across countries.
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incentives in society. Without property rights, individuals will not have the incentive to
invest in physical or human capital or adopt more eﬃcient technologies. Economic insti-
tutions are also important because they help to allocate resources to their most eﬃcient
uses, they determine who gets profits, revenues and residual rights of control. When
markets are missing or ignored (as they were in the Soviet Union, for example), gains
from trade go unexploited and resources are misallocated. Societies with economic in-
stitutions that facilitate and encourage factor accumulation, innovation and the eﬃcient
allocation of resources will prosper.
Central to this chapter and to much of political economy research on institutions is
that economic institutions, and institutions more broadly, are endogenous; they are, at
least in part, determined by society, or a segment of it. Consequently, the question of
why some societies are much poorer than others is closely related to the question of why
some societies have much “worse economic institutions” than others.
Even though many scholars including John Locke, Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill,
Douglass North and Robert Thomas have emphasized the importance of economic insti-
tutions, we are far from a useful framework for thinking about how economic institutions
are determined and why they vary across countries. In other words, while we have good
reason to believe that economic institutions matter for economic growth, we lack the cru-
cial comparative static results which will allow us to explain why equilibrium economic
institutions diﬀer (and perhaps this is part of the reason why much of the economics
literature has focused on the proximate causes of economic growth, largely neglecting
fundamental institutional causes).
This chapter has three aims. First, we selectively review the evidence that diﬀerences
in economic institutions are a fundamental cause of cross-country diﬀerences in prosper-
ity. Second, we outline a framework for thinking about why economic institutions vary
across countries. We emphasize the potential comparative static results of this frame-
work and also illustrate the key mechanisms through a series of historical examples and
case studies. Finally, we highlight a large number of areas where future theoretical and
empirical work would be very fruitful.
1.2 The Argument
The basic argument of this chapter can be summarized as follows:
1. Economic institutions matter for economic growth because they shape the in-
centives of key economic actors in society, in particular, they influence investments in
physical and human capital and technology, and the organization of production. Al-
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though cultural and geographical factors may also matter for economic performance,
diﬀerences in economic institutions are the major source of cross-country diﬀerences in
economic growth and prosperity. Economic institutions not only determine the aggre-
gate economic growth potential of the economy, but also an array of economic outcomes,
including the distribution of resources in the future (i.e., the distribution of wealth, of
physical capital or human capital). In other words, they influence not only the size of
the aggregate pie, but how this pie is divided among diﬀerent groups and individuals
in society. We summarize these ideas schematically as (where the subscript t refers to
current period and t+ 1 to the future):
economic institutionst =⇒
(
economic performancet
distribution of resourcest+1
.
2. Economic institutions are endogenous. They are determined as collective choices
of the society, in large part for their economic consequences. However, there is no
guarantee that all individuals and groups will prefer the same set of economic institutions
because, as noted above, diﬀerent economic institutions lead to diﬀerent distributions
of resources. Consequently, there will typically be a conflict of interest among various
groups and individuals over the choice of economic institutions. So how are equilibrium
economic institutions determined? If there are, for example, two groups with opposing
preferences over the set of economic institutions, which group’s preferences will prevail?
The answer depends on the political power of the two groups. Although the eﬃciency of
one set of economic institutions compared with another may play a role in this choice,
political power will be the ultimate arbiter. Whichever group has more political power is
likely to secure the set of economic institutions that it prefers. This leads to the second
building block of our framework:
political powert =⇒ economic institutionst
3. Implicit in the notion that political power determines economic institutions is the
idea that there are conflicting interests over the distribution of resources and therefore
indirectly over the set of economic institutions. But why do the groups with conflicting
interests not agree on the set of economic institutions that maximize aggregate growth
(the size of the aggregate pie) and then use their political power simply to determine the
distribution of the gains? Why does the exercise of political power lead to economic in-
eﬃciencies and even poverty? We will explain that this is because there are commitment
problems inherent in the use of political power. Individuals who have political power
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cannot commit not to use it in their best interests, and this commitment problem cre-
ates an inseparability between eﬃciency and distribution because credible compensating
transfers and side-payments cannot be made to oﬀset the distributional consequences of
any particular set of economic institutions.
4. The distribution of political power in society is also endogenous, however. In
our framework, it is useful to distinguish between two components of political power,
which we refer to as de jure (institutional) and de facto political power. Here de jure
political power refers to power that originates from the political institutions in society.
Political institutions, similarly to economic institutions, determine the constraints on
and the incentives of the key actors, but this time in the political sphere. Examples
of political institutions include the form of government, for example, democracy vs.
dictatorship or autocracy, and the extent of constraints on politicians and political elites.
For example, in a monarchy, political institutions allocate all de jure political power to
the monarch, and place few constraints on its exercise. A constitutional monarchy, in
contrast, corresponds to a set of political institutions that reallocates some of the political
power of the monarch to a parliament, thus eﬀectively constraining the political power
of the monarch. This discussion therefore implies that:
political institutionst =⇒ de jure political powert
5. There is more to political power than political institutions, however. A group of
individuals, even if they are not allocated power by political institutions, for example
as specified in the constitution, may nonetheless possess political power. Namely, they
can revolt, use arms, hire mercenaries, co-opt the military, or use economically costly
but largely peaceful protests in order to impose their wishes on society. We refer to this
type of political power as de facto political power, which itself has two sources. First, it
depends on the ability of the group in question to solve its collective action problem, i.e.,
to ensure that people act together, even when any individual may have an incentive to
free ride. For example, peasants in the Middle Ages, who were given no political power
by the constitution, could sometimes solve the collective action problem and undertake
a revolt against the authorities. Second, the de facto power of a group depends on
its economic resources, which determine both their ability to use (or misuse) existing
political institutions and also their option to hire and use force against diﬀerent groups.
Since we do not yet have a satisfactory theory of when groups are able to solve their
collective action problems, our focus will be on the second source of de facto political
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power, hence:
distribution of resourcest =⇒ de facto political powert
6. This brings us to the evolution of one of the two main state variables in our
framework, political institutions (the other state variable is the distribution of resources,
including distribution of physical and human capital stocks etc.). Political institutions
and the distribution of resources are the state variables in this dynamic system because
they typically change relatively slowly, and more importantly, they determine economic
institutions and economic performance both directly and indirectly. Their direct eﬀect
is straightforward to understand. If political institutions place all political power in
the hands of a single individual or a small group, economic institutions that provide
protection of property rights and equal opportunity for the rest of the population are
diﬃcult to sustain. The indirect eﬀect works through the channels discussed above:
political institutions determine the distribution of de jure political power, which in turn
aﬀects the choice of economic institutions. This framework therefore introduces a natural
concept of a hierarchy of institutions, with political institutions influencing equilibrium
economic institutions, which then determine economic outcomes.
Political institutions, though slow changing, are also endogenous. Societies transition
from dictatorship to democracy, and change their constitutions to modify the constraints
on power holders. Since, like economic institutions, political institutions are collective
choices, the distribution of political power in society is the key determinant of their
evolution. This creates a tendency for persistence: political institutions allocate de jure
political power, and those who hold political power influence the evolution of political
institutions, and they will generally opt to maintain the political institutions that give
them political power. However, de facto political power occasionally creates changes
in political institutions. While these changes are sometimes discontinuous, for example
when an imbalance of power leads to a revolution or the threat of revolution leads
to major reforms in political institutions, often they simply influence the way existing
political institutions function, for example, whether the rules laid down in a particular
constitution are respected as in most functioning democracies, or ignored as in current-
day Zimbabwe. Summarizing this discussion, we have:
political powert =⇒ political institutionst+1
Putting all these pieces together, a schematic (and simplistic) representation of our
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framework is as follows:
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The two state variables are political institutions and the distribution of resources,
and the knowledge of these two variables at time t is suﬃcient to determine all the other
variables in the system. While political institutions determine the distribution of de jure
political power in society, the distribution of resources influences the distribution of de
facto political power at time t. These two sources of political power, in turn, aﬀect the
choice of economic institutions and influence the future evolution of political institutions.
Economic institutions determine economic outcomes, including the aggregate growth
rate of the economy and the distribution of resources at time t+ 1. Although economic
institutions are the essential factor shaping economic outcomes, they are themselves
endogenous and determined by political institutions and distribution of resources in
society.
There are two sources of persistence in the behavior of the system: first, political
institutions are durable, and typically, a suﬃciently large change in the distribution of
political power is necessary to cause a change in political institutions, such as a transition
from dictatorship to democracy. Second, when a particular group is rich relative to
others, this will increase its de facto political power and enable it to push for economic
and political institutions favorable to its interests. This will tend to reproduce the initial
relative wealth disparity in the future. Despite these tendencies for persistence, the
framework also emphasizes the potential for change. In particular, “shocks”, including
changes in technologies and the international environment, that modify the balance of
(de facto) political power in society and can lead to major changes in political institutions
and therefore in economic institutions and economic growth.
A brief example might be useful to clarify these notions before commenting on some
of the underlying assumptions and discussing comparative statics. Consider the devel-
opment of property rights in Europe during the Middle Ages. There is no doubt that
lack of property rights for landowners, merchants and proto- industrialists was detri-
mental to economic growth during this epoch. Since political institutions at the time
placed political power in the hands of kings and various types of hereditary monarchies,
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such rights were largely decided by these monarchs. Unfortunately for economic growth,
while monarchs had every incentive to protect their own property rights, they did not
generally enforce the property rights of others. On the contrary, monarchs often used
their powers to expropriate producers, impose arbitrary taxation, renege on their debts,
and allocate the productive resources of society to their allies in return for economic
benefits or political support. Consequently, economic institutions during the Middle
Ages provided little incentive to invest in land, physical or human capital, or technol-
ogy, and failed to foster economic growth. These economic institutions also ensured that
the monarchs controlled a large fraction of the economic resources in society, solidifying
their political power and ensuring the continuation of the political regime.
The seventeenth century, however, witnessed major changes in the economic and
political institutions that paved the way for the development of property rights and
limits on monarchs’ power, especially in England after the Civil War of 1642 and the
Glorious Revolution of 1688, and in the Netherlands after the Dutch Revolt against
the Hapsburgs. How did these major institutional changes take place? In England,
for example, until the sixteenth century the king also possessed a substantial amount
of de facto political power, and leaving aside civil wars related to royal succession, no
other social group could amass suﬃcient de facto political power to challenge the king.
But changes in the English land market (Tawney, 1941) and the expansion of Atlantic
trade in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson,
2002b) gradually increased the economic fortunes, and consequently the de facto power
of landowners and merchants. These groups were diverse, but contained important
elements that perceived themselves as having interests in conflict with those of the king:
while the English kings were interested in predating against society to increase their
tax incomes, the gentry and merchants were interested in strengthening their property
rights.
By the seventeenth century, the growing prosperity of the merchants and the gentry,
based both on internal and overseas, especially Atlantic, trade, enabled them to field
military forces capable of defeating the king. This de facto power overcame the Stuart
monarchs in the Civil War and Glorious Revolution, and led to a change in political
institutions that stripped the king of much of his previous power over policy. These
changes in the distribution of political power led to major changes in economic insti-
tutions, strengthening the property rights of both land and capital owners and spurred
a process of financial and commercial expansion. The consequence was rapid economic
growth, culminating in the Industrial Revolution, and a very diﬀerent distribution of
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economic resources from that in the Middle Ages.
It is worth returning at this point to two critical assumptions in our framework.
First, why do the groups with conflicting interests not agree on the set of economic
institutions that maximize aggregate growth? So in the case of the conflict between the
monarchy and the merchants, why does the monarchy not set up secure property rights
to encourage economic growth and tax some of the benefits? Second, why do groups
with political power want to change political institutions in their favor? For instance, in
the context of the example above, why did the gentry and merchants use their de facto
political power to change political institutions rather than simply implement the policies
they wanted? The answers to both questions revolve around issues of commitment and
go to the heart of our framework.
The distribution of resources in society is an inherently conflictual, and therefore
political, decision. As mentioned above, this leads to major commitment problems,
since groups with political power cannot commit to not using their power to change the
distribution of resources in their favor. For example, economic institutions that increased
the security of property rights for land and capital owners during the Middle Ages would
not have been credible as long as the monarch monopolized political power. He could
promise to respect property rights, but then at some point, renege on his promise, as
exemplified by the numerous financial defaults by medieval kings (e.g., Veitch, 1986).
Credible secure property rights necessitated a reduction in the political power of the
monarch. Although these more secure property rights would foster economic growth,
they were not appealing to the monarchs who would lose their rents from predation
and expropriation as well as various other privileges associated with their monopoly
of political power. This is why the institutional changes in England as a result of the
Glorious Revolution were not simply conceded by the Stuart kings. James II had to be
deposed for the changes to take place.
The reason why political power is often used to change political institutions is related.
In a dynamic world, individuals care not only about economic outcomes today but also
in the future. In the example above, the gentry and merchants were interested in their
profits and therefore in the security of their property rights, not only in the present but
also in the future. Therefore, they would have liked to use their (de facto) political power
to secure benefits in the future as well as the present. However, commitment to future
allocations (or economic institutions) was not possible because decisions in the future
would be decided by those who had political power in the future with little reference to
past promises. If the gentry and merchants would have been sure to maintain their de
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facto political power, this would not have been a problem. However, de facto political
power is often transient, for example because the collective action problems that are
solved to amass this power are likely to resurface in the future, or other groups, especially
those controlling de jure power, can become stronger in the future. Therefore, any change
in policies and economic institutions that relies purely on de facto political power is
likely to be reversed in the future. In addition, many revolutions are followed by conflict
within the revolutionaries. Recognizing this, the English gentry and merchants strove
not just to change economic institutions in their favor following their victories against
the Stuart monarchy, but also to alter political institutions and the future allocation of
de jure power. Using political power to change political institutions then emerges as a
useful strategy to make gains more durable. The framework that we propose, therefore,
emphasizes the importance of political institutions, and changes in political institutions,
as a way of manipulating future political power, and thus indirectly shaping future, as
well as present, economic institutions and outcomes.
This framework, though abstract and highly simple, enables us to provide some
preliminary answers to our main question: why do some societies choose “good economic
institutions”? At this point, we need to be more specific about what good economic
institutions are. A danger we would like to avoid is that we define good economic
institutions as those that generate economic growth, potentially leading to a tautology.
This danger arises because a given set of economic institutions may be relatively good
during some periods and bad during others. For example, a set of economic institutions
that protects the property rights of a small elite might not be inimical to economic
growth when all major investment opportunities are in the hands of this elite, but could
be very harmful when investments and participation by other groups are important for
economic growth (see Acemoglu, 2003b). To avoid such a tautology and to simplify and
focus the discussion, throughout we think of good economic institutions as those that
provide security of property rights and relatively equal access to economic resources to
a broad cross-section of society. Although this definition is far from requiring equality
of opportunity in society, it implies that societies where only a very small fraction of the
population have well-enforced property rights do not have good economic institutions.
Consequently, as we will see in some of the historical cases discussed below, a given
set of economic institutions may have very diﬀerent implications for economic growth
depending on the technological possibilities and opportunities.
Given this definition of good economic institutions as providing secure property rights
for a broad cross-section of society, our framework leads to a number of important com-
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parative statics, and thus to an answer to our basic question. First, political institutions
that place checks on those who hold political power, for example, by creating a balance
of power in society, are useful for the emergence of good economic institutions. This
result is intuitive; without checks on political power, power holders are more likely to
opt for a set of economic institutions that are beneficial for themselves and detrimen-
tal for the rest of society, which will typically fail to protect property rights of a broad
cross-section of people. Second, good economic institutions are more likely to arise when
political power is in the hands of a relatively broad group with significant investment
opportunities. The reason for this result is that, everything else equal, in this case power
holders will themselves benefit from secure property rights.2 Third, good economic insti-
tutions are more likely to arise and persist when there are only limited rents that power
holders can extract from the rest of society, since such rents would encourage them to
opt for a set of economic institutions that make the expropriation of others possible.
These comparative statics therefore place political institutions at the center of the story,
as emphasized by our term “hierarchy of institutions” above. Political institutions are
essential both because they determine the constraints on the use of (de facto and de
jure) political power and also which groups hold de jure political power in society. We
will see below how these comparative statics help us understand institutional diﬀerences
across countries and over time in a number of important historical examples.
1.3 Outline
In the next section we discuss how economic institutions constitute the basis for a
fundamental theory of growth, and we contrast this with other potential fundamental
theories. In section 3 we consider some empirical evidence that suggests a key role
for economic institutions in determining long-run growth. We also emphasize some
of the key problems involved in establishing a causal relationship between economic
institutions and growth. We then show in section 4 how the experience of European
colonialism can be used as a ‘natural experiment’ which can address these problems.
Having established the central causal role of economic institutions and their importance
relative to other factors in cross-country diﬀerences in economic performance, the rest
of the paper focuses on developing a theory of economic institutions. Section 5 discusses
four types of explanation for why countries have diﬀerent institutions, and argues that
2The reason why we inserted the caveat of “a relatively broad group” is that when a small group
with significant investment opportunities holds power, they may sometimes opt for an oligarchic system
where their own property rights are protected, but those of others are not (see Acemoglu, 2003b).
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the most plausible is the social conflict view. According to this theory, bad institutions
arise because the groups with political power benefit from bad institutions. The emphasis
on social conflict arises naturally from our observation above that economic institutions
influence the distribution of resources as well as eﬃciency. Diﬀerent groups or individuals
will therefore prefer diﬀerent institutions and conflict will arise as each tries to get their
own way. Section 6 delves deeper into questions of eﬃciency and asks why a political
version of the Coase Theorem does not hold. We emphasize the idea that commitment
problems are intrinsic to the exercise of political power. In section 7 we argue that a
series of historical examples of diverging economic institutions are best explained by the
social conflict view. These examples illustrate how economic institutions are determined
by the distribution of political power, and how this distribution is influenced by political
institutions. Section 8 puts these ideas together to build our theory of institutions. In
section 9 we then consider two more extended examples of the theory in action, the
rise of constitutional rule in early modern Europe, and the creation of mass democracy,
particularly in Britain, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Section 10 concludes
with a discussion of where this research program can go next.
2 Fundamental Causes of Income Differences
We begin by taking a step back. The presumption in the introduction was that economic
institutions matter, and should in fact be thought of as one of the key fundamental causes
of economic growth and cross-country diﬀerences in economic performance. How do we
know this?
2.1 Three Fundamental Causes
If standard economic models of factor accumulation and endogenous technical change
only provide proximate explanations of comparative growth, what types of explanations
would constitute fundamental ones? Though there is no conventional wisdom on this,
we can distinguish three such theories: the first set of theories, our main focus in this
chapter, emphasize the importance of economic institutions, which influence economic
outcomes by shaping economic incentives; the second emphasize geography, and the
third emphasize the importance of culture (a fourth possibility is that diﬀerences are
due to “luck,” some societies were just lucky; however we do not believe that diﬀerences
in luck by themselves constitute a suﬃcient fundamental causes of cross-country income
diﬀerences).
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2.1.1 Economic Institutions
At its core, the hypothesis that diﬀerences in economic institutions are the fundamental
cause of diﬀerent patterns of economic growth is based on the notion that it is the way
that humans themselves decide to organize their societies that determines whether or
not they prosper. Some ways of organizing societies encourage people to innovate, to
take risks, to save for the future, to find better ways of doing things, to learn and educate
themselves, solve problems of collective action and provide public goods. Others do not.
The idea that the prosperity of a society depends on its economic institutions goes
back at least to Adam Smith, for example in his discussions of mercantilism and the role
of markets, and was prominent in the work of many nineteenth century scholars such as
John Stuart Mill (see the discussion in Jones, 1981): societies are economically successful
when they have ‘good’ economic institutions and it is these institutions that are the
cause of prosperity. We can think of these good economic institutions as consisting
of an inter-related cluster of things. There must be enforcement of property rights
for a broad cross-section of society so that all individuals have an incentive to invest,
innovate and take part in economic activity. There must also be some degree of equality
of opportunity in society, including such things as equality before the law, so that those
with good investment opportunities can take advantage of them.3
One could think of other types of economic institutions, for instance markets. Tra-
ditional accounts of economic growth by historians, following the lead of Adam Smith,
emphasized the spread of markets (Pirenne, 1937, Hicks, 1969) and more recent theories
of comparative development are also based on diﬀerences in various economic institu-
tions. Models of poverty traps in the tradition of Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), Murphy,
Vishny and Shleifer (1989a,b) and Acemoglu (1995, 1997), are based on the idea that
market imperfections can lead to the existence of multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria. As
a consequence a country can get stuck in a Pareto inferior equilibrium, associated with
poverty, but getting out of such a trap necessitates coordinated activities that the market
cannot deliver. The literature initiated by Banerjee and Newman (1993) and Galor and
Zeira (1993) is based on the idea that when capital markets are imperfect, the distribu-
tion of wealth matters for who can invest and societies with skewed income distributions
can be stuck in poverty.
3In Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), we coined the term institutions of private property
for a cluster of would economic institutions, including the rule of law and the enforcement of property
rights, and the term extractive institutions to designate institutions under which the rule of law and
property rights are absent for large majorities of the population.
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These theories provide interesting models of how incentives depend on expectations
of others’ behavior or the distribution of wealth given an underlying set of market im-
perfections. They take the market structure largely as given, however. We believe that
the structure of markets is endogenous, and partly determined by property rights. Once
individuals have secure property rights and there is equality of opportunity, the incen-
tives will exist to create and improve markets (even though achieving perfect markets
would be typically impossible). Thus we expect diﬀerences in markets to be an out-
come of diﬀering systems of property rights and political institutions, not unalterable
characteristics responsible for cross-country diﬀerences in economic performance. This
motivates our focus on economic institutions related to the enforcement of the property
rights of a broad cross-section of society.
2.1.2 Geography
While institutional theories emphasize the importance of man-made factors shaping
incentives, an alternative is to focus on the role of “nature”, that is, on the physical and
geographical environment. In the context of understanding cross-country diﬀerences
in economic performance, this approach emphasizes diﬀerences in geography, climate
and ecology that determine both the preferences and the opportunity set of individual
economic agents in diﬀerent societies. We refer to this broad approach as the “geography
hypothesis”. There are at least three main versions of the geography hypothesis, each
emphasizing a diﬀerent mechanism for how geography aﬀects prosperity.
First, climate may be an important determinant of work eﬀort, incentives, or even
productivity. This idea dates back at least to the famous French philosopher, Mon-
tesquieu ([1748], 1989), who wrote in his classic book The Spirit of the Laws: “The heat
of the climate can be so excessive that the body there will be absolutely without strength.
So, prostration will pass even to the spirit; no curiosity, no noble enterprise, no generous
sentiment; inclinations will all be passive there; laziness there will be happiness,” and
“People are ... more vigorous in cold climates. The inhabitants of warm countries are,
like old men, timorous; the people in cold countries are, like young men, brave”. One of
the founders of modern economics Marshall is another prominent figure who emphasized
the importance of climate, arguing: “vigor depends partly on race qualities: but these,
so far as they can be explained at all, seem to be chiefly due to climate” (1890, p. 195).
Second, geography may determine the technology available to a society, especially
in agriculture. This view is developed by an early Nobel Prize winner in economics,
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Myrdal, who wrote “serious study of the problems of underdevelopment ... should take
into account the climate and its impacts on soil, vegetation, animals, humans and phys-
ical assets–in short, on living conditions in economic development” (1968, volume 3, p.
2121). More recently, Diamond espouses this view, “... proximate factors behind Eu-
rope’s conquest of the Americas were the diﬀerences in all aspects of technology. These
diﬀerences stemmed ultimately from Eurasia’s much longer history of densely populated
... [societies dependent on food production],” which was in turn determined by geo-
graphical diﬀerences between Europe and the Americas (1997, p. 358). The economist
Sachs has been a recent and forceful proponent of the importance of geography in agri-
cultural productivity, stating that “By the start of the era of modern economic growth, if
not much earlier, temperate-zone technologies were more productive than tropical-zone
technologies ...” (2001, p. 2).
The third variant of the geography hypothesis, especially popular over the past
decade, links poverty in many areas of the world to their “disease burden,” empha-
sizing that: “The burden of infectious disease is similarly higher in the tropics than
in the temperate zones” (Sachs, 2000, p. 32). Bloom and Sachs (1998) claim that the
prevalence of malaria, a disease which kills millions of children every year in sub-Saharan
Africa, reduces the annual growth rate of sub-Saharan African economies by more than
1.3 percent a year (this is a large eﬀect, implying that had malaria been eradicated in
1950, income per capita in sub-Saharan Africa would be double of what it is today).
2.1.3 Culture
The final fundamental explanation for economic growth emphasizes the idea that diﬀer-
ent societies (or perhaps diﬀerent races or ethnic groups) have diﬀerent cultures, because
of diﬀerent shared experiences or diﬀerent religions. Culture is viewed as a key determi-
nant of the values, preferences and beliefs of individuals and societies and, the argument
goes, these diﬀerences play a key role in shaping economic performance.
At some level, culture can be thought to influence equilibrium outcomes for a given
set of institutions. Possibly there are multiple equilibria connected with any set of
institutions and diﬀerences in culture mean that diﬀerent societies will coordinate on
diﬀerent equilibria. Alternatively, as argued by Greif (1993), diﬀerent cultures generate
diﬀerent sets of beliefs about how people behave and this can alter the set of equilibria
for a given specification of institutions (for example, some beliefs will allow punishment
strategies to be used whereas others will not).
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The most famous link between culture and economic development is that proposed by
Weber (1930) who argued that the origins of industrialization in western Europe could
be traced to the Protestant reformation and particularly the rise of Calvinism. In his
view, the set of beliefs about the world that was intrinsic to Protestantism were crucial
to the development of capitalism. Protestantism emphasized the idea of predestination
in the sense that some individuals were ‘chosen’ while others were not. “We know that
a part of humanity is saved, the rest damned. To assume that human merit or guilt play
a part in determining this destiny would be to think of God’s absolutely free decrees,
which have been settled from eternity, as subject to change by human influence, an
impossible contradiction” (Weber, 1930, p. 60).
But who had been chosen and who not? Calvin did not explain this. Weber (1930,
p. 66) notes “Quite naturally this attitude was impossible for his followers ... for the
broad mass of ordinary men ... So wherever the doctrine of predestination was held,
the question could not be suppressed whether there was any infallible criteria by which
membership of the electi could be known.” Practical solutions to this problem were
quickly developed, “... in order to attain that self-confidence intense worldly activity is
recommended as the most suitable means. It and it alone disperses religious doubts and
gives the certainly of grace” Weber (1930, pp. 66-67).
Thus “however useless good works might be as a means of attaining salvation ...
nevertheless, they are indispensable as a sign of election. They are the technical means,
not of purchasing salvation, but of getting rid of the fear of damnation” (p. 69). Though
economic activity was encouraged, enjoying the fruits of such activity was not. “Waste
of time is ... the first and in principle the deadliest of sins. The span of human life is
infinitely short and precious to make sure of one’s own election. Loss of time through
sociability, idle talk, luxury, even more sleep than is necessary for health ... is worthy
of absolute moral condemnation ... Unwillingness to work is symptomatic of the lack of
grace” (pp. 104-105).
Thus Protestantism led to a set of beliefs which emphasized hard work, thrift, saving,
and where economic success was interpreted as consistent with (if not actually signalling)
being chosen by God. Weber contrasted these characteristics of Protestantism with those
of other religions, such as Catholicism, which he argued did not promote capitalism. For
instance on his book on Indian religion he argued that the caste system blocked capitalist
development (Weber, 1958, p. 112).
More recently, scholars, such as Landes (1998), have also argued that the origins of
Western economic dominance are due to a particular set of beliefs about the world and
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how it could be transformed by human endeavor, which is again linked to religious diﬀer-
ences. Although Barro and McCleary (2003) provide evidence of a positive correlation
between the prevalence of religious beliefs, notably about hell and heaven, and economic
growth, this evidence does not show a causal eﬀect of religion on economic growth, since
religious beliefs are endogenous both to economic outcomes and to other fundamental
causes of income diﬀerences (points made by Tawney, 1926, and Hill, 1961b, in the
context of Weber’s thesis).
Ideas about how culture may influence growth are not restricted to the role of reli-
gion. Within the literature trying to explain comparative development there have been
arguments that there is something special about particular cultural endowments, usually
linked to particular nation states. For instance, Latin America may be poor because of
its Iberian heritage, while North America is prosperous because of its Anglo-Saxon her-
itage (Ve´liz, 1994). In addition, a large literature in anthropology argues that societies
may become ‘dysfunctional’ or ‘maladapted’ in the sense that they adopt a system of
beliefs or ways or operating which do not promote the success or prosperity of the society
(see Edgerton, 1992, for a survey of this literature). The most famous version of such an
argument is due to Banfield (1958) who argued that the poverty of Southern Italy was
due to the fact that people had adopted a culture of “amoral familiarism” where they
only trusted individuals of their own families and refused to cooperate or trust anyone
else. This argument was revived in the extensive empirical study of Putnam (1993) who
characterized such societies as lacking “social capital”. Although Putnam and others,
for example, Knack and Keefer (1997) and Durlauf and Fafchamps (2003), document
positive correlations between measures of social capital and various economic outcomes,
there is no evidence of a causal eﬀect, since, as with religious beliefs discussed above,
measures of social capital are potentially endogenous.
3 Institutions Matter
We now argue that there is convincing empirical support for the hypothesis that dif-
ferences in economic institutions, rather than geography or culture, cause diﬀerences in
incomes per-capita. Consider first Figure 1.
This shows the cross-country bivariate relationship between the log of GDP per-
capita in 1995 and a broad measure of property rights, “protection against expropriation
risk”, averaged over the period 1985 to 1995. The data on economic institutions come
from Political Risk Services, a private company which assesses the risk that investments
will be expropriated in diﬀerent countries. These data, first used by Knack and Keefer
16
(1995) and subsequently by Hall and Jones (1999) and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson
(2001, 2002a) are imperfect as a measure of economic institutions, but the findings are
robust to using other available measures of economic institutions. The scatter plot shows
that countries with more secure property rights, i.e., better economic institutions, have
higher average incomes.
It is tempting to interpret Figure 1 as depicting a causal relationship (i.e., as estab-
lishing that secure property rights cause prosperity). Nevertheless, there are well known
problems with making such an inference. First, there could be reverse causation — per-
haps only countries that are suﬃciently wealthy can aﬀord to enforce property rights.
More importantly, there might be a problem of omitted variable bias. It could be some-
thing else, e.g., geography, that explains both why countries are poor and why they have
insecure property rights. Thus if omitted factors determine institutions and incomes,
we would spuriously infer the existence of a causal relationship between economic in-
stitutions and incomes when in fact no such relationship exists. Trying to estimate the
relationship between institutions and prosperity using Ordinary Least Squares, as was
done by Knack and Keefer (1995) and Barro (1997) could therefore result in biased
regression coeﬃcients.
To further illustrate these potential identification problems, suppose that climate,
or geography more generally, matters for economic performance. In fact, a simple scat-
terplot shows a positive association between latitude (the absolute value of distance
from the equator) and income per capita. Montesquieu, however, not only claimed that
warm climate makes people lazy and thus unproductive, but also unfit to be governed by
democracy. He argued that despotism would be the political system in warm climates.
Therefore, a potential explanation for the patterns we see in Figure 1 is that there is
an omitted factor, geography, which explains both economic institutions and economic
performance. Ignoring this potential third factor would lead to mistaken conclusions.
Even if Montesquieu’s story appears both unrealistic and condescending to our mod-
ern sensibilities, the general point should be taken seriously: the relationship shown in
Figure 1, and for that matter that shown in Figure 2, is not causal. As we pointed out
in the context of the eﬀect of religion or social capital on economic performance, these
types of scatterplots, correlations, or their multidimensional version in OLS regressions,
cannot establish causality.
What can we do? The solution to these problems of inference is familiar in micro-
econometrics: find a source of variation in economic institutions that should have no
eﬀect on economic outcomes, or depending on the context, look for a natural experiment.
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As an example, consider first one of the clearest natural experiments for institutions.
3.1 The Korean Experiment
Until the end of World War II, Korea was under Japanese occupation. Korean inde-
pendence came shortly after the Japanese Emperor Hirohito announced the Japanese
surrender on August 15, 1945. After this date, Soviet forces entered Manchuria and
North Korea and took over the control of these provinces from the Japanese. The major
fear of the United States during this time period was the takeover of the entire Korean
peninsular either by the Soviet Union or by communist forces under the control of the
former guerrilla fighter, Kim Il Sung. U.S. authorities therefore supported the influential
nationalist leader Syngman Rhee, who was in favor of separation rather than a united
communist Korea. Elections in the South were held in May 1948, amidst a widespread
boycott by Koreans opposed to separation. The newly elected representatives proceeded
to draft a new constitution and established the Republic of Korea to the south of the
38th parallel. The North became the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, under the
control of Kim Il Sung. These two independent countries organized themselves in very
diﬀerent ways and adopted completely diﬀerent sets of institutions. The North followed
the model of Soviet socialism and the Chinese Revolution in abolishing private property
of land and capital. Economic decisions were not mediated by the market, but by the
communist state. The South instead maintained a system of private property and the
government, especially after the rise to power of Park Chung Hee in 1961, attempted to
use markets and private incentives in order to develop the economy.
Before this “natural experiment” in institutional change, North and South Korea
shared the same history and cultural roots. In fact, Korea exhibited an unparalleled
degree of ethnic, linguistic, cultural, geographic and economic homogeneity. There are
few geographic distinctions between the North and South, and both share the same
disease environment. For example, the CIA Factbook describes the climate of North
Korea as “temperate with rainfall concentrated in summer” and that of South Korea
as “temperate, with rainfall heavier in summer than winter”. In terms of terrain North
Korea is characterized as consisting of “mostly hills and mountains separated by deep,
narrow valleys; coastal plains wide in west, discontinuous in east,” while South Korea
is “mostly hills and mountains; wide coastal plains in west and south”. In terms of
natural resources North Korea is better endowed with significant reserves of coal, lead,
tungsten, zinc, graphite, magnesite, iron ore, copper, gold, pyrites, salt, fluorspar, hy-
dropower. South Korea’s natural resources are “coal, tungsten, graphite, molybdenum,
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lead, hydropower potential.” Both countries share the same geographic possibilities in
terms of access to markets and the cost of transportation.
Other man-made initial economic conditions were also similar, and if anything, ad-
vantaged the North. For example, there was significant industrialization during the
colonial period with the expansion of both Japanese and indigenous firms. Yet this de-
velopment was concentrated more in the North than the South. For instance, the large
Japanese zaibatsu of Noguchi, which accounted for one third of Japanese investment in
Korea, was centered in the North. It built large hydroelectric plants, including the Suiho
dam on the Yalu river, second in the world only to the Boulder dam on the Colorado
river. It also created Nippon Chisso, the second largest chemical complex in the world
that was taken over by the North Korean state. Finally, in Ch’ongjin North Korea also
had the largest port on the Sea of Japan. All in all, despite some potential advantages
for the North,4 Maddison (2001) estimates that at the time of separation, North and
South Korea had approximately the same income per capita.
We can therefore think of the splitting on the Koreas 50 years ago as a natural ex-
periment that we can use to identify the causal influence of a particular dimension of
institutions on prosperity. Korea was split into two, with the two halves organized in
radically diﬀerent ways, and with geography, culture and many other potential determi-
nants of economic prosperity held fixed. Thus any diﬀerences in economic performance
can plausibly be attributed to diﬀerences in institutions.
Consistent with the hypothesis that it is institutional diﬀerences that drive com-
parative development, since separation, the two Koreas have experienced dramatically
diverging paths of economic development: see Figure 3. By the late 1960’s South Korea
was transformed into one of the Asian “miracle” economies, experiencing one of the most
rapid surges of economic prosperity in history while North Korea stagnated. By 2000
the level of income in South Korea was $16,100 while in North Korea it was only $1,000.
By 2000 the South had become a member of the Organization of Economic Coopera-
tion and Development, the rich nations club, while the North had a level of per-capita
income about the same as a typical sub-Saharan African country. There is only one
plausible explanation for the radically diﬀerent economic experiences on the two Koreas
after 1950: their very diﬀerent institutions led to divergent economic outcomes. In this
context, it is noteworthy that the two Koreas not only shared the same geography, but
also the same culture.
4Such initial diﬀerences were probably eradicated by the intensive bombing campaign that the United
States unleashed in the early 1950’s on North Korea (see Cumings, 2004, chapter 1).
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It is possible that Kim Il Sung and Communist Party members in the North believed
that communist policies would be better for the country and the economy in the late
1940s. However, by the 1980s it was clear that the communist economic policies in
the North were not working. The continued eﬀorts of the leadership to cling to these
policies and to power can only be explained by those leaders wishing to look after their
own interests at the expense of the population at large. Bad institutions are therefore
kept in place, clearly not for the benefit of society as a whole, but for the benefit of the
ruling elite, and this is a pattern we encounter in most cases of institutional failure that
we discuss in detail below.
However convincing on its own terms, the evidence from this natural experiment is
not suﬃcient for the purposes of establishing the importance of economic institutions
as the primary factor shaping cross-country diﬀerences in economic prosperity. First,
this is only one case, and in the better-controlled experiments in the natural sciences, a
relatively large sample is essential. Second, here we have an example of an extreme case,
the diﬀerence between a market-oriented economy and a communist one. Few social
scientists today would deny that a lengthy period of totalitarian centrally planned rule
has significant economic costs. And yet, many might argue that diﬀerences in economic
institutions among capitalist economies or among democracies are not the major factor
leading to diﬀerences in their economic trajectories. To establish the major role of
economic institutions in the prosperity and poverty of nations we need to look at a
larger scale “natural experiment” in institutional divergence.
3.2 The Colonial Experiment
The colonization of much of the world by Europeans provides such a large scale natural
experiment. Beginning in the early fifteenth century and massively intensifying after
1492, Europeans conquered many other nations. The colonization experience trans-
formed the institutions in many diverse lands conquered or controlled by Europeans.
Most importantly, Europeans imposed very diﬀerent sets of institutions in diﬀerent
parts of their global empire, as exemplified most sharply by the contrast to the eco-
nomic institutions in the northeast of America to those in the plantation societies of
the Caribbean. As a result, while geography was held constant, Europeans initiated
large changes in economic institutions, in the social organization of diﬀerent societies.
We will now show that this experience provides evidence which conclusively establishes
the central role of economic institutions in development. Given the importance of this
material and the details we need to provide, we discuss the colonial experience in the
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next section.
4 The Reversal of Fortune
The impact of European colonialism on economic institutions is perhaps most dramat-
ically conveyed by a single fact–historical evidence shows that there has been a re-
markable Reversal of Fortune in economic prosperity within former European colonies.
Societies like the Mughals in India, and the Aztecs and the Incas in the Americas were
among the richest civilizations in 1500, yet the nation states that now coincide with
the boundaries of these empires are among the poorer societies of today. In contrast,
countries occupying the territories of the less-developed civilizations in North America,
New Zealand and Australia are now much richer than those in the lands of the Mughals,
Aztecs and Incas.
4.1 The reversal among the former colonies
The Reversal of Fortune is not confined to such comparisons. Using reasonable proxies
for prosperity before modern times, we can show that it is a much more systematic
phenomenon. Our proxies for income per capita in pre-industrial societies are urban-
ization rates and population density. Only societies with a certain level of productivity
in agriculture and a relatively developed system of transport and commerce can sustain
large urban centers and a dense population. Figure 4 shows the relationship between
income per capita and urbanization (fraction of the population living in urban centers
with greater than 5,000 inhabitants) today, and demonstrates that in the current period
there is a significant relationship between urbanization and prosperity.
Naturally, high rates of urbanization do not mean that the majority of the population
lived in prosperity. In fact, before the twentieth century urban centers were often centers
of poverty and ill health. Nevertheless, urbanization is a good proxy for average income
per capita in society, which closely corresponds to the measure we are using to look at
prosperity.
Figures 5 and 6 show the relationship between income per capita today and urban-
ization rates and (log) population density in 1500 for the sample of European colonies.5
We pick 1500 since it is before European colonization had an eﬀect on any of these
5The sample includes the countries colonized by the Europeans between the 15th and the 19th
centuries as part of their overseas expansion after the discovery of the New World and the rounding of
the Cape of Good Hope. It therefore excludes Ireland, parts of the Russian Empire and also the Middle
East and countries briefly controlled by European powers as U.N. Mondays during the 20th century.
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societies. A strong negative relationship, indicating a reversal in the rankings in terms
of economic prosperity between 1500 and today, is clear in both figures. In fact, the
figures show that in 1500 the temperate areas were generally less prosperous than the
tropical areas, but this pattern too was reversed by the twentieth century.
The urbanization data for these Figures come from Bairoch (1988), Bairoch, Batou
and Che`vre (1988), Chandler (1987), and Eggimann (1999). The data on population
density are fromMcEvedy and Jones (1978). Details and further results are in Acemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson (2002a).
There is something extraordinary about this reversal. For example, after the initial
spread of agriculture there was remarkable persistence in urbanization and population
density for all countries, including those which were to be subsequently colonized by
Europeans. In Figures 7 and 8 we show the relationships for urbanization plotting
separately the relationship between urbanization in 1000 and in 1500 for the samples of
colonies and all other countries. Both figures show persistence, not reversal. Although
Ancient Egypt, Athens, Rome, Carthage and other empires rose and fell, what these
pictures show is that there was remarkable persistence in the prosperity of regions.
Moreover, reversal was not the general pattern in the world after 1500. Figure 9
shows that within countries not colonized by Europeans in the early modern and modern
period, there was no reversal between 1500 and 1995. There is therefore no reason to
think that what is going on in Figures 5 and 6 is some sort of natural reversion to the
mean.
4.2 Timing of the Reversal
When did the reversal occur? One possibility is that it arose shortly after the conquest
of societies by Europeans but Figures 10 and 11 show that the previously-poor colonies
surpassed the former highly-urbanized colonies starting in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries, and this went hand in hand with industrialization. Figure 10
shows average urbanization in colonies with relatively low and high urbanization in
1500. The initially high-urbanization countries have higher levels of urbanization and
prosperity until around 1800. At that time the initially low-urbanization countries start
to grow much more rapidly and a prolonged period of divergence begins. Figure 11
shows industrial production per capita in a number of countries. Although not easy to
see in the figure, there was more industry (per capita and total) in India in 1750 than
in the United States. By 1860, the United States and British colonies with relatively
good economic institutions, such as Australia and New Zealand, began to move ahead
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rapidly, and by 1953, a huge gap had opened up.
4.3 Interpreting the Reversal
Which of the three broad hypotheses about the sources of cross-country income dif-
ferences are consistent with the reversal and its timing? These patterns are clearly
inconsistent with simple geography based views of relative prosperity. In 1500 it was
the countries in the tropics which were relatively prosperous, in 2003 it is the reverse.
This makes it implausible to base a theory of relative prosperity today, as Sachs (2000,
2001) does, on the intrinsic poverty of the tropics. This argument is inconsistent with
the historical evidence.
Nevertheless, following Diamond (1997), one could propose what Acemoglu, Johnson
and Robinson (2002a) call a “sophisticated geography hypothesis” which claims that ge-
ography matters but in a time varying way. For example, Europeans created “latitude
specific” technology, such as heavy metal ploughs, that only worked in temperate lati-
tudes and not with tropical soils. Thus when Europe conquered most of the world after
1492, they introduced specific technologies that functioned in some places (the United
States, Argentina, Australia) but not others (Peru, Mexico, West Africa). However, the
timing of the reversal, coming as it does in the nineteenth century, is inconsistent with
the most natural types of sophisticated geography hypotheses. Europeans may have had
latitude specific technologies, but the timing implies that these technologies must have
been industrial, not agricultural, and it is diﬃcult to see why industrial technologies
do not function in the tropics (and in fact, they have functioned quite successfully in
tropical Singapore and Hong Kong).6
Similar considerations weigh against the culture hypothesis. Although culture is slow-
changing the colonial experiment was suﬃciently radical to have caused major changes in
the cultures of many countries that fell under European rule. In addition, the destruction
of many indigenous populations and immigration from Europe are likely to have created
new cultures or at least modified existing cultures in major ways (see Vargas Llosa, 1989,
for a fictionalized account of just such a cultural change). Nevertheless, the culture
hypothesis does not provide a natural explanation for the reversal, and has nothing to
say on the timing of the reversal. Moreover, we discuss below how econometric models
that control for the eﬀect of institutions on income do not find any evidence of an eﬀect
6A possible link is that proposed by Lewis (1978) who argued that tropical agriculture is less produc-
tive than temperate agriculture, and that an ‘agricultural revolution’ is a prerequisite to an industrial
revolution because high agricultural productivity is needed to stimulate the demand for industrial goods.
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of religion or culture on prosperity.
The most natural explanation for the reversal comes from the institutions hypothesis,
which we discuss next.
4.4 Economic Institutions and the Reversal
Is the Reversal of Fortune consistent with a dominant role for economic institutions in
comparative development? The answer is yes. In fact, once we recognize the variation
in economic institutions created by colonization, we see that the Reversal of Fortune is
exactly what the institutions hypothesis predicts.
In Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002a) we tested the connection between initial
population density, urbanization, and the creation of good economic institutions. We
showed that, others things equal, the higher the initial population density or the greater
initial urbanization, the worse were subsequent institutions, including both institutions
right after independence and today. Figures 12 and 13 show these relationships using
the same measure of current economic institutions used in Figure 1, protection against
expropriation risk today. They document that the relatively densely settled and highly
urbanized colonies ended up with worse (or ‘extractive’) institutions, while sparsely-
settled and non-urbanized areas received an influx of European migrants and developed
institutions protecting the property rights of a broad cross-section of society. European
colonialism therefore led to an institutional reversal, in the sense that the previously-
richer and more-densely settled places ended up with worse institutions.7
To be fair, it is possible that the Europeans did not actively introduce institutions
discouraging economic progress in many of these places, but inherited them from pre-
vious civilizations there. The structure of the Mughal, Aztec and Inca empires were
already very hierarchical with power concentrated in the hands of narrowly based ruling
elites and structured to extract resources from the majority for the benefit of a minor-
ity. Often Europeans simply took over these existing institutions. Whether this is so is
secondary for our focus, however. What matters is that in densely-settled and relatively-
developed places it was in the interests of Europeans to have institutions facilitating the
extraction of resources thus not respecting the property rights of the majority, while
in the sparsely-settled areas it was in their interests to develop institutions protecting
7The institutional reversal does not mean that institutions were necessarily better in the previously
more densely-settled areas (see the next paragraph). It only implies a tendency for the relatively
poorer and less densely-settled areas to end up with better institutions than previously-rich and more
densely-settled areas.
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property rights. These incentives led to an institutional reversal.
The institutional reversal, combined with the institutions hypothesis, predicts the
Reversal of Fortune: relatively rich places got relatively worse economic institutions,
and if these institutions are important, we should see them become relatively poor over
time. This is exactly what we find with the Reversal of Fortune.
Moreover, the institutions hypothesis is consistent with the timing of the reversal.
Recall that the institutions hypothesis links incentives to invest in physical and human
capital and in technology to economic institutions, and argues that economic prosperity
results from these investments. Therefore, economic institutions should become more
important when there are major new investment opportunities. The opportunity to
industrialize was the major investment opportunity of the nineteenth century. Countries
that are rich today, both among the former European colonies and other countries, are
those that industrialized successfully during this critical period.
4.5 Understanding the colonial experience
The explanation for the reversal that emerges from our discussion so far is one in which
the economic institutions in various colonies were shaped by Europeans to benefit them-
selves. Moreover, because conditions and endowments diﬀered between colonies, Euro-
peans consciously created diﬀerent economic institutions, which persisted and continue
to shape economic performance. Why did Europeans introduce better institutions in
previously-poor and unsettled areas than in previously-rich and densely-settled areas?
The answer to this question relates to the comparative statics of our theoretical frame-
work. Leaving a full discussion to later, we can note a couple of obvious ideas.
Europeans were more likely to introduce or maintain economic institutions facilitat-
ing the extraction of resources in areas where they would benefit from the extraction
of resources. This typically meant areas controlled by a small group of Europeans, and
areas oﬀering resources to be extracted. These resources included gold and silver, valu-
able agricultural commodities such as sugar, but most importantly people. In places
with a large indigenous population, Europeans could exploit the population, be it in
the form of taxes, tributes or employment as forced labor in mines or plantations. This
type of colonization was incompatible with institutions providing economic or civil rights
to the majority of the population. Consequently, a more developed civilization and a
denser population structure made it more profitable for the Europeans to introduce
worse economic institutions.
In contrast, in places with little to extract, and in sparsely-settled places where the
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Europeans themselves became the majority of the population, it was in their interests
to introduce economic institutions protecting their own property rights.
4.6 Settlements, Mortality and Development
The initial conditions we have emphasized so far refer to indigenous population den-
sity and urbanization. In addition, the disease environments diﬀered markedly among
the colonies, with obvious consequences on the attractiveness of European settlement.
As we noted above, when Europeans settled, they established institutions that they
themselves had to live under. Therefore, whether Europeans could settle or not had an
exogenous eﬀect on the subsequent path of institutional development. In other words,
if the disease environment 200 or more years ago aﬀects outcomes today only through
its eﬀect on institutions today, then we can use this historical disease environment as
an exogenous source of variation in current institutions. From an econometric point of
view we have a valid instrument which will enable us to pin down the casual eﬀect of
economic institutions on prosperity.8
We developed this argument in Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) and inves-
tigated it empirically. We used initial conditions in the European colonies, particularly
data from Curtin (1989, 1998) and Gutierrez (1986) on the mortality rates faced by Eu-
ropeans (primarily soldiers, sailors, and bishops), as instruments for current economic
institutions. The justification for this is that, outside of its eﬀect on economic institu-
tions during the colonial period, historical European mortality has no impact on current
income levels. Figures 14 and 15 give scatter plots of this data against contemporaneous
economic institutions and GDP per-capita. The sample is countries which were colo-
nized by Europeans in the early modern and modern periods and thus excludes, among
others, China, Japan, Korea, Thailand.
Figure 14 shows the very strong relationship between the historical mortality risk
faced by Europeans and the current extent to which property rights are enforced. A
bivariate regression has an R2 of 0.26. It also shows that there were very large diﬀerences
in European mortality. Countries such as Australia, New Zealand and the United States
were very healthy with life expectancy typically greater than in Britain. On the other
hand mortality was extremely high in Africa, India and South-East Asia. Diﬀerential
8Although European mortality is potentially correlated with indigenous mortality, which may deter-
mine income today, in practice local populations have developed much greater immunity to malaria and
yellow fever. Thus the historical experience of European mortality is a valid instrument for institutional
development. See Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001).
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mortality was largely due to tropical diseases such as malaria and yellow fever and at the
time it was not understood how these diseases arose nor how they could be prevented
or cured.
In Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) we showed, using European mortality
as an instrument for the current enforcement of property rights, that most of the gap
between rich and poor countries today is due to diﬀerences in economic institutions.
More precisely, we showed (p. 1387) that if one took two typical–in the sense that
they both lie on the regression line–countries with high and low expropriation risk,
like Nigeria and Chile, then almost the entire diﬀerence in incomes per-capita between
them could be explained by the diﬀerences in the security of property rights. We also
presented regression evidence that showed that once the eﬀect of economic institutions
on GDP per-capita was properly controlled for, geographical variables, such as latitude,
whether or not a country is land-locked and the current disease environment, have no
explanatory power for current prosperity.
These ideas and results provide an interpretation of why there are strong correlations
between geographical variables such as latitude and income per-capita. Basically this
is because Europeans did not have immunity to tropical diseases during the colonial
period and thus settler colonies tended, other things equal, to be created in temperate
latitudes. Thus the historical creation of economic institutions was correlated with
latitude. Without considering the role of economic institutions it is easy to find a
spurious relationship between latitude and income per-capita. However, once economic
institutions are properly controlled for, these relationships go away. There is no causal
eﬀect of geography on prosperity today, though geography may have been important
historically in shaping economic institutions.
What about the role of culture? On the face of it, the Reversal of Fortune is consistent
with cultural explanations of comparative growth. The Europeans not only brought
new institutions, they also brought their own cultures. There seem to be three main
ways to test this idea. First, cultures may be systematically related to the national
identity of the colonizing power. For example, the British may have implanted a ‘good’
Anglo-Saxon culture into colonies such as Australia and the United States, while the
Spanish may have condemned Latin America by endowing it with a Hispanic or Iberian
culture (the academic literature is full of ideas like this, for recent versions see Ve´liz,
1994, North, Summerhill and Weingast, 2000, and Wiarda, 2001). Second, following
Landes (1998), Europeans may have had a culture, for example a work ethic or set of
beliefs, which was uniquely propitious to prosperity. Finally, following Weber (1930),
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Europeans also brought diﬀerent religions with diﬀerent implications for prosperity. Such
a hypothesis could explain why Latin America is relatively poor since its citizens are
primarily Roman Catholic, while North America is relatively rich because its citizens
are mostly Protestant.
However, the econometric evidence in Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) is not
consistent with any these views. Once we control properly for the eﬀects of economic
institutions, neither the identity of the colonial power, nor the contemporary fraction of
Europeans in the population, nor the proportions of the populations of various religions,
are significant determinants of income per capita.
These econometric results are supported by historical examples. For instance, with
respect to the identity of the colonizing power, in the 17th century the Dutch had perhaps
the best domestic economic institutions in the world but the colonies they created in
South-East Asia ended up with institutions designed for the extraction of resources,
providing little economic or civil rights to the indigenous population.
It is also be clear that the British in no way simply re-created British institutions
in their colonies. For example, by 1619 the North American colony of Virginia had a
representative assembly with universal male suﬀrage, something that did not arrive
in Britain itself until 1919. Another telling example is due to Newton (1914) and
Kupperman (1993), who showed that the Puritan colony in Providence Island in the
Caribbean quickly became just like any other Caribbean slave colony despite the Puri-
tanical inheritance. Although no Spanish colony has been as successful economically as
British colonies such as the United States, it is also important to note that Britain had
many unsuccessful colonies (in terms of per capita income), such as in Africa, India and
Bangladesh (see Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2004).
To emphasize that the culture or the religion of the colonizer was not at the root of
the divergent economic performances of the colonies, Figure 16 shows the reversal among
the British colonies (with population density in 1500 on the horizontal axis). Just as in
Figure 6, there is a strong negative relationship between population density in 1500 and
income per capita today.
With respect to the role of Europeans, Singapore and Hong Kong are now two
of the richest countries in the world, despite having negligible numbers of Europeans.
Moreover, Argentina and Uruguay have higher proportions of people of European descent
than the United States and Canada, but are much less rich. To further document this,
Figure 17 shows a similar reversal of fortune for countries where the fraction of those
with European descent in 1975 is less than 5 percent of the population.
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Overall, the evidence is not consistent with a major role of geography, religion or cul-
ture transmitted by the identity of the colonizer or the presence of Europeans. Instead,
diﬀerences in economic institutions appear to be the robust causal factor underlying the
diﬀerences in income per capita across countries. Institutions are therefore the funda-
mental cause of income diﬀerences and long-run growth.
5 Why Do Institutions Differ?
We saw that economic institutions matter, indeed are central in determining relative
prosperity. In terms of the diﬀerent fundamental theories that we discussed, there is
overwhelming support for the emphasis of North and Thomas on institutions, as opposed
to alternative candidate explanations which emphasize geography or culture. Yet, as
we discussed in the introduction, finding that diﬀerences in economic institutions can
account for the preponderance of diﬀerences in per-capita income between countries
creates as many questions as it answers. For example, why do countries have diﬀerent
economic institutions? If poor countries are poor because they have bad economic
institutions why do they not change them to better institutions? In short, to explain
the evidence presented in the last two sections we need a theory of economic institutions.
The theory will help to explain the equilibrium set of economic institutions in a particular
country and the comparative statics of this theory will help to explain why economic
institutions diﬀer across countries.
In the Introduction (section 1.2), we began to develop such a theory based on social
conflict over economic institutions. We have now substantiated the first point we made
there, that economic institutions determine prosperity. We must now move to substan-
tiate our second point, that economic institutions must be treated as endogenous and
what which economic institutions emerge depends on the distribution of political power
in society. This is a key step towards our theory of economic institutions. In the process
of substantiating this point however it is useful to step back and discuss other alternative
approaches to developing a theory of economic institutions. Broadly speaking, there are
four main approaches to the question of why institutions diﬀer across countries, one of
which coincides with the approach we are proposing, the social conflict view. We next
discuss each of these separately and our assessment as to whether they provide a satis-
factory framework for thinking about diﬀerences in economic institutions (see Acemoglu,
2003a, and Robinson, 1998, for related surveys of some of these approaches). We shall
conclude that the approach we sketched in section 1.2 is by far the most promising one.
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5.1 The Efficient Institutions View–The Political Coase Theorem
According to this view, societies will choose the economic institutions that are socially
eﬃcient. How this surplus will be distributed among diﬀerent groups or agents does not
aﬀect the choice of economic institutions. We stress here that the concept of eﬃciency is
stronger than simply Pareto Optimality; it is associated with surplus, wealth or output
maximization.
The underlying reasoning of this view comes from the Coase Theorem. Coase (1960)
argued that when diﬀerent economic parties could negotiate costlessly, they will be able
to bargain to internalize potential externalities. A farmer, who suﬀers from the pollution
created by a nearby factory, can pay the factory owner to reduce pollution. Similarly,
if the current economic institutions benefit a certain group while creating a dispropor-
tionate cost for another, these two groups can negotiate to change the institutions. By
doing so they will increase the size of the total surplus that they can divide between
themselves, and they can then bargain over the distribution of this additional surplus.
Many diﬀerent versions of the eﬃcient economic institutions view have been pro-
posed. Indeed, assuming that existing economic institutions are eﬃcient is a standard
methodological approach of economists, i.e., observing an institution, one tries to un-
derstand what are the circumstances that lead it to be eﬃcient. Demsetz (1967) argued
that private property emerged from common property when land became suﬃciently
scarce and valuable that it was eﬃcient to privatize it. More recently, Williamson’s
(1985) research, as well as Coase’s (1936) earlier work and the more formal analysis by
Grossman and Hart (1986), argues that the governance of firms or markets is such as
to guarantee eﬃciency (given the underlying informational and contractual constraints).
Williamson argued that firms emerged as an eﬃcient response to contractual problems
that plague markets, particularly the fact that there may be ex-post opportunism when
individuals make relationship specific investments. Another famous application of the
eﬃcient institutions view is due to North and Thomas (1973) who argued that feudal
economic institutions, such as serfdom, were an eﬃcient contract between serfs and lords.
The lords provided a public good, protection, in exchange for the labor of the serfs on
their lands. In this view, without a modern fiscal system this was an eﬃcient way to
organize this exchange. (See Townsend, 1993, for a recent version of the idea that other
economic institutions of Medieval Europe, such as the open field system, were eﬃcient).
Williamson and North and Thomas do not specify how diﬀerent parties will reach
agreement to achieve eﬃcient economic institutions, and this may be problematical in
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the sense that many economic institutions relevant for development are collective choices
not individual bargains. There may therefore be free riding problems inherent in the
creation of eﬃcient economic institutions. Nevertheless, the underlying idea, articulated
by Becker (1960) and Wittman (1989), is that, at least in democracies, competition
among pressure groups and political parties will lead to eﬃcient policies and collective
choices. In their view, an ineﬃcient economic institution cannot be stable because a
political entrepreneur has an incentive to propose a better economic institution and
with the extra surplus generated will be able to make himself more attractive to voters.
The eﬃcient institutions view regards the structure of political institutions or power as
irrelevant. This may matter for the distribution of total surplus, but it will not matter
for eﬃciency itself. The ‘eﬃcient’ set of political institutions is therefore indeterminate.
The notion that a Coasian logic applies in political life as well as in economics is
referred to by Acemoglu (2003a) as the Political Coase Theorem. Although the intuition
that individuals and groups will strive towards eﬃcient economic outcomes is appealing,
there are both theoretical and empirical limits to the Political Coase Theorem. First, as
argued by Acemoglu (2003a) and further discussed below, in politics there is an inherent
commitment problem, often making the Political Coase Theorem inapplicable.
Second, the Political Coase Theorem does not take us very far in understanding the
eﬀect of economic (or indeed political) institutions on economic outcomes — in this view,
economic institutions are chosen eﬃciently, and all societies have the best possible eco-
nomic institutions given their needs and underlying structures; hence, with the Political
Coase Theorem, economic institutions cannot be the fundamental cause of income dif-
ferences. However, the empirical results we discussed above suggest a major role for
such institutional diﬀerences.
The only way to understand these patterns is to think of economic institutions vary-
ing for reasons other than the underlying needs of societies. In fact, the instrumental
variables and natural experiment strategies we exploited above make use precisely of a
source of variation unrelated to the underlying needs of societies. For example, South
and North Korea did not adopt very diﬀerent economic systems because they had dif-
ferent needs, but because diﬀerent systems were imposed on them for other exogenous
reasons. In sum, we need a framework for understanding why certain societies consis-
tently end up with economic institutions that are not, from a social point of view, in
their best interests. We need a framework other than the Political Coase Theorem.
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5.2 The Ideology View
A second view is that economic institutions diﬀer across countries because of ideological
diﬀerences — because of the similarity between this and the previous view, Acemoglu
(2003a) calls this the Modified Political Coase Theorem. According to this view, societies
may choose diﬀerent economic institutions, with very diﬀerent implications, because
they–or their leaders–disagree about what would be good for the society. According
to this approach, there is suﬃcient uncertainty about the right economic institutions that
well-meaning political actors diﬀer about what’s good for their own people. Societies
where the leaders or the electorate turn out to be right ex post are those that prosper.
The important point is that, just as with the eﬃcient institutions view, there are strong
forces preventing the implementation of policies that are known to be bad for the society
at large.
Several theoretical models have developed related ideas. For example, Piketty (1995)
examined a model where diﬀerent people have diﬀerent beliefs about how much eﬀort
is rewarded in society. If eﬀort is not rewarded then taxation generates few distortions
and agents with such beliefs prefer a high tax rate. On the other hand if one believes
that eﬀort is rewarded then low taxes are preferable. Piketty showed that dispersion
of beliefs could create dispersion of preferences over tax rates, even if all agents had
the same objective. Moreover, incorrect beliefs could be self-fulfilling and persist over
time because diﬀerent beliefs tend to generate information consistent with those beliefs.
Romer (2003) also presents a model where voters have diﬀerent beliefs and showed that
if mistakes are correlated, then society can choose a socially ineﬃcient outcome. These
models show that if diﬀerent societies have diﬀerent beliefs about what is socially eﬃcient
they can rationally choose diﬀerent economic institutions.
Belief diﬀerences clearly do play a role in shaping policies and institutions. Several
interesting examples of this come from the early experience of independence in for-
mer British colonies. For example, it is diﬃcult to explain Julius Nyerere’s policies in
Tanzania without some reference to his and other leading politicians’ beliefs about the
desirability of a socialist society. It also appears true that in India the Fabian socialist
beliefs of Jawaharlal Nehru were important in governing the initial direction that Indian
economic policies took.
Nevertheless, the scope of a theory of institutional divergence and comparative de-
velopment based on ideology seems highly limited. Can we interpret the diﬀerences in
institutional development across the European colonies or the divergence in the eco-
32
nomic institutions and policies between the North and South of Korea as resulting from
diﬀerences in beliefs? For example, could it be the case that while Rhee, Park, and other
South Korean leaders believed in the superiority of capitalist institutions and private
property rights enforcement, Kim Il Sung and Communist Party members in the North
believed that communist policies would be better for the country?
In the case of South versus North Korea, this is certainly a possibility. However, even
if diﬀerences in beliefs could explain the divergence in economic institutions in the im-
mediate aftermath of separation, by the 1980s it was clear that the communist economic
policies in the North were not working. The continued eﬀort of the leadership to cling
to these policies, and to power, can only be explained by leaders looking after their own
interests at the expense of the population at large. Most likely, North Korean leaders,
the Communist Party, and bureaucratic elites are prolonging the current system, which
gives them greater economic and political returns than the alternative, even though they
fully understand the costs that the system imposes on the North Korean people.
Diﬀerences in colonial policies are even harder to explain on the basis of diﬀerences
in ideology. British colonists established diﬀerent economic institutions in very diﬀerent
parts of the world: in the Caribbean they set up plantation societies based on slav-
ery, supported by highly oppressive economic institutions. In contrast, the economic
institutions that developed in areas where the British settled, and where there was no
large population of indigenous to be captured and put to work, and where slavery could
not be profitably used, such as northeastern United States, Canada, Australia and New
Zealand, were very diﬀerent. Moreover, diﬀerences in the incentives of the colonists in
various colonies are easy to understand: when they did not settle, they were choosing
economic institutions simply to extract resources from the native population. When
they settled in large numbers, economic institutions and policies emerged in order to
protect them in the future and encourage investment and prosperity.
These considerations make us tend towards a view which emphasizes the actions of
key economic and political agents that are taken rationally and in recognition of their
consequences, not simply diﬀerences in beliefs. We do not deny that belief diﬀerences
and ideology often play important roles but we do not believe that a satisfactory theory
of institutional diﬀerences can be founded on diﬀerences in ideology.
5.3 The Incidental Institutions View
The eﬃcient institutions view is explicitly based on economic reasoning: the social costs
and benefits of diﬀerent economic institutions are weighed against each other to deter-
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mine which economic institutions should prevail. Eﬃciency arises because individuals
ultimately calculate according to social costs and benefits. Institutions are therefore
choices. A diﬀerent approach, popular among many political scientists and sociologists,
but also some economists, is to downplay choices and to think of institutions, both eco-
nomic and political, as the by-product or unintended consequence of other social inter-
actions or historical accidents. In other words, historical accidents at critical junctures
determine institutions, and these institutions persist for a long time, with significant
consequences.
Here, we discuss two such theories. The first is the theory of political institutions
developed by Moore (1966) in his Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, the
second is the recent emphasis in the economics literature on legal origins, for example
as in the work of Shleifer and his co-authors (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and
Vishny, 1998, 1999, Djankov, LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2002, 2003, Glaeser
and Shleifer, 2002).
Moore attempted to explain the diﬀerent paths of political development in Britain,
Germany and Russia. In particular, he investigated why Britain evolved into a democ-
racy, while Germany succumbed to fascism and Russia had a communist revolution.
Moore stressed the extent of commercialization of agriculture and resulting labor re-
lations in the countryside, the strength of the ‘bourgeoisie,’ and the nature of class
coalitions. In his theory, democracy emerged when there was a strong, politically as-
sertive, commercial middle class, and when agriculture had commercialized so that there
were no feudal labor relations in the countryside. Fascism arose when the middle classes
were weak and entered into a political coalition with landowners. Finally, a commu-
nist revolution resulted when the middle classes were non-existent, agriculture was not
commercialized, and rural labor was repressed through feudal regulations. In Moore’s
theory, therefore, class coalitions and the way agriculture is organized determine which
political institutions will emerge. However, the organization of agriculture is not chosen
with an eye to its eﬀects on political institutions, so these institutions are an unintended
consequence. Although Moore was not explicitly concerned with economic development,
it is a direct implication of his analysis that societies may end up with institutions that
do not maximize income or growth, for example, when they take the path to communist
revolution.
Beginning with the work on shareholder rights (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer
and Vishny, 1998), continuing to the eﬃciency of government (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1999) and more recently the eﬃciency of the legal system
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(Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2003), Shleifer and his co-authors
have argued that a central source of variation in many critical economic institutions
is the origin of the legal system. For example, “Civil laws give investors weaker legal
rights than common laws do, independent of the level of per-capita income. Common-
law countries give both shareholders and creditors–relatively speaking–the strongest,
and French-civil-law countries the weakest, protection. ” (La Porta et al., 1998, p. 1116)
These diﬀerences have important implications for resource allocation. For example,
when shareholders have poor protection of their rights, ownership of shares tends to
be more highly concentrated. Djankov et al. (2003) collected a cross-national dataset
on how diﬀerent countries legal systems dealt with the issue of evicting a tenant for
nonpayment of rent and collecting on a bounced check. They used these data to construct
an index of procedural formalism of dispute resolution for each country and showed that
such formalism was systematically greater in civil than in common law countries, and
is associated with higher expected duration of judicial proceedings, less consistency, less
honesty, less fairness in judicial decisions, and more corruption. Legal origins therefore
seems to matter for important institutional outcomes.
Where do legal origins come from? The main argument is that they are historical
accidents, mostly related to the incidence of European colonialism. For example, Latin
American countries adopted the Napoleonic codes in the nineteenth century because
these were more compatible with their Spanish legal heritage. Importantly, the fact
that Latin American countries therefore have ‘French legal origin’ is due to a historical
accident and can be treated as exogenous with respect to current institutional outcomes.
What about the diﬀerence between common law and civil law? Glaeser and Shleifer
(2002) argue that the divergence between these systems stems from the medieval period
and reflects the balance of power between the lords and the king in England and France.
Once these systems established, they persisted long after the initial rationale vanished.
Although we believe that historical accidents and persistence are important, in re-
ality the aspect of choice over institutions seems too important to be denied. Even if
institutions have a tendency to persist, their persistence is still a choice, in the sense
that if the agents decided to change institutions, change would be possible. There are
important examples from history of countries radically changing their legal systems such
as in Japan after the Meiji restoration, Russia after the Crimean War, and Turkey un-
der Mustafa Kemal in the 1920’s. Another example might be central planning of the
economy. Though many countries adopted this way or organizing the economy some
abandoned it while others, such as North Korea and Cuba, still maintain it. The point
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here is that though institutions may in some circumstances be the incidental outcome
of history, at some point people will start to ask why society has the institutions that it
does and to consider other alternatives. At this point we are back in the realm of choice.
5.4 The Social Conflict View
According to this view, economic (and political) institutions are not always chosen by
the whole society (and not for the benefit of the whole society), but by the groups that
control political power at the time (perhaps as a result of conflict with other groups).
These groups will choose the economic institutions that maximize their own rents, and
the economic institutions that result may not coincide with those that maximize total
surplus, wealth or income. For example, economic institutions that enforce property
rights by restricting state predation may not be in the interest of a ruler who wants
to appropriate assets in the future. By establishing property rights, this ruler would
be reducing his own future rents, so may well prefer economic institutions other than
enforced private property. Therefore, equilibrium economic institutions will not be those
that maximize the size of the overall pie, but the slice of the pie taken by the powerful
groups.
The first systematic development of this point of view in the economics literature is
North (1981), who argued in the chapter on “A Neoclassical Theory of the State” that
agents who controlled the state should be modeled as self-interested. He then argued
that the set of property rights that they would choose for society would be those that
maximized their payoﬀ and because of ‘transactions costs,’ these would not necessarily
be the set that maximized social welfare. One problem with North’s analysis is that he
does not clarify what the transactions costs creating a divergence between the interests
of the state and the citizens are. Here, we will argue that commitment problems are at
the root of this divergence.
The notion that elites, i.e., the politically powerful, may opt for economic institutions
which increase their incomes, often at the expense of society, is of course also present
in much of the Marxist and dependency theory literature. For example, Dobb (1948),
Brenner (1976, 1982) and Hilton (1981) saw feudalism, contrary to North and Thomas’s
(1973) model, as a set of institutions designed to extract rents from the peasants at the
expense of social welfare.9 Dependency theorists such as Williams (1944), Wallerstein
(1974-1982), Rodney (1972), Frank (1978) and Cardoso and Faletto (1979) argued that
9Postan (1966, pp. 603-604) famously estimated that lords extracted about 50% of the entire pro-
duction of peasants.
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the international trading system was designed to extract rents from developing countries
to the benefit of developed countries.
The social conflict view includes situations where economic institutions may initially
be eﬃcient for a set of circumstances but are no longer eﬃcient once the environment
changes. For example, Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2001) show that though certain
sorts of organizations may be useful for countries a long way from the technological
frontier, it may be socially eﬃcient to change them subsequently. This may not happen
however because it is not privately rational. An interesting example may be the large
business enterprises (the chaebol) of South Korea. In the context of political institutions,
one might then develop a similar thesis. Certain sets of institutions are eﬃcient for
very poor countries but they continue to apply even after they cease to be the eﬃcient
institutional arrangement.
In stark contrast to the eﬃcient institutions view, political institutions play a crucial
role in the social conflict view. Which economic institutions arise depends on who
has political power to create or block diﬀerent economic institutions. Since political
institutions play a central role in the allocation of such power they will be an intimate
part of a social conflict theory of economic institutions.
What distinguishes the social conflict view from the ideological view is that social
conflict can lead to choices of economic institutions which cause underdevelopment even
when all agents have common knowledge that this is so. What distinguishes it from
the incidental view is that it emphasizes that institutional choices which cause under-
development are conscious choices, rather than the result of some historical accident.
The aspect that distinguishes the social conflict view from the eﬃcient institutions view
is that it does not assume that institutions are always eﬃcient. This is one possible
outcome but it is not the only one or indeed the most likely. Why is this? Why cannot
eﬃciency be separated from distribution? We discuss this issue in the next section.
6 Sources of Inefficiencies
Having motivated our first two assertions in section 1.2, we are now in a position to
discuss the third, related to the importance of commitment problems. The inability to
commit to how political power will be used in the future means that the impact of eco-
nomic institutions on eﬃciency cannot be separated from their eﬀects on distribution.10
In any market situation where economic exchange takes place, and the quid is sepa-
10An alternative approach would be to stress informational asymmetries (Farrell, 1987).
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rated from the pro quo, issues of commitment will arise. That these issues are of crucial
importance has been recognized in the literatures on incomplete contracts and renego-
tiation (e.g., Hart, 1995). Nevertheless, if the legal system functions properly, there
is an array of enforceable contracts that owners can sign with managers, workers with
employers, borrowers with lenders etc. These contracts can be enforced because there is
an authority, a third party, with the power to enforce contracts. Although the authority
that is delegated to enforce contracts and to resolve disputes varies depending on the
exact situation, all such power ultimately emanates from the state, which, in modern
society, has a near-monopoly on the use of legitimate coercion. An owner and manager
can write a contract because they believe that the state, and its agents the courts, would
be impartial enforcers of the contract.
In contrast, if, for example, a manager believed that the state would be aligned with
the interests of the owner and refuse to punish the owner if and when he failed to make a
payment stipulated by the contract, then the contract would have little value. Therefore,
the presence of an impartial enforcer is important for contracting. The problem when it
comes to institutional choices is that there is no such impartial third party that can be
trusted to enforce contracts. This is the origin of the commitment problem in politics.
To elaborate on this point, let us consider a situation where society can be governed as
a dictatorship or as a democracy. Imagine that the dictator does not relinquish his power,
but instead he promises that he will obey the rules of democracy, so that individuals
can undertake the same investments as they would in democracy. This promise would
not necessarily be credible. As long as the political system remains a dictatorship, there
is no higher authority to make the dictator stick to his promise. There is no equivalent
of a contract that can be enforced by an impartial third-party. After all, the dictator
has the monopoly of military and political power, so he is the final arbiter of conflicting
interests. There is no other authority to force the dictator to abide by his promises.
A similar problem plagues the reverse solution, whereby the dictator agrees to a vol-
untary transition to democracy in return for some transfers in the future to compensate
him for the lost income and privileges. Those who will benefit from a transition to
democracy would be willing to make such promises, but once the dictator relinquishes
his political power, there is no guarantee that citizens would agree to tax themselves in
order to make payments to this former dictator. Promises of compensation to a former
dictator are typically not credible.
The essence of the problem is commitment. Neither party can commit to compensate
the other nor can they commit to take actions that would not be in their interests ex
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post. The reason why commitment problems are severe in these examples is because we
are dealing with political power. Diﬀerent institutions are associated with diﬀerent dis-
tributions of political power, and there is no outside impartial party with the will and the
power to enforce agreements. In some cases, there may be self-enforcing promises that
maintain an agreement. Acemoglu (2003a) discusses such possibilities, but in general,
there are limits to such self-enforcing agreements, because they require the participants
to be suﬃciently patient, and when it comes to matters of political power, the future is
uncertain enough that no party would behave in a highly patient manner.
Based on this reasoning, we can now discuss three diﬀerent channels via which the
presence of commitment problems will lead to the choice and persistence of ineﬃcient
institutions.
6.1 Holdup
Imagine a situation in which an individual or a group holds unconstrained political
power. Also suppose that productive investments can be undertaken by a group of
citizens or producers that are distinct from the “political elites”, i.e., the current power
holders. The producers will only undertake the productive investments if they expect
to receive the benefits from their investments. Therefore, a set of economic institutions
protecting their property rights are necessary for investment. Can the society opt for a
set of economic institutions ensuring such secure property rights? The answer is often
no (even assuming that “society” wants to do so).
The problem is that the political elites–those in control of political power–cannot
commit to respect the property rights of the producers once the investment are under-
taken. Naturally, ex ante, before investments are undertaken, they would like to promise
secure property rights. But the fact that the monopoly of political power in their hands
implies that they cannot commit to not hold-up producers once the investments are
sunk.
This is an obvious parallel to the hold-up problem in the theory of the firm, where
once one of the parties in a relationship has undertaken investments specific to the
relationship, other parties can hold her up, and capture some of the returns from her
investments. As in the theory of the firm, the prospect of hold-up discourages investment.
But now the problem is much more severe, since it is not only investments that are
specific to a relationship that are subject to hold-up, but all investments.
This is therefore an example of how ineﬃcient economic institutions arise because of a
monopoly of political power. Those with political power cannot commit not to use their
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political power ex post, and this translates directly into a set of economic institutions
that do not provide secure property rights to groups without political power. The con-
sequence is clear: without such protection, productive investments are not undertaken,
and opportunities for economic growth go unexploited.
The reason why these ineﬃcient economic institutions persist (or may be the equi-
librium institutions of the society) is related to commitment problems. Parallel to our
above example of inducing the dictator to relinquish power, there are two ways to intro-
duce secure property rights. First, in principle, political elites could promise to respect
property rights. However, mere promises would not be credible, unless backed up by the
political elites relinquishing power, and this would mean relinquishing their rents and
privileges. Second, political elites can be bought oﬀ by the beneficiaries of a system of
more secure property rights. This would typically be achieved by a promise of future
payments. For example, after investments are undertaken and output is produced, a
share can be given to the political elites. But, as pointed out above, there is another,
reverse commitment problem here; the beneficiaries of the new regime cannot commit
to making the promised payments to the previous political elites.
Many real world examples illustrate the commitment problems involved in limiting
the use of political power. In practice, although buying oﬀ dictators and persuading
them to leave power is diﬃcult, there have been many attempts to do so, usually by
trying to guarantee that they will not be persecuted subsequently. One way of doing this
is to give them asylum in another country. Nevertheless, such attempts rarely succeed,
most likely again because of commitment problems (the new regime cannot commit to
abide by its promises). An illustrative example of this is the attempts by the Reagan
administration to persuade Jean-Claude (‘Baby Doc’) Duvalier to relinquish power in
Haiti in 1986. In the face of a popular uprising and rising social and economic chaos, the
Reagan administration, via the intermediation of the Jamaican Prime Minster Edward
Seaga, tried to persuade Duvalier to go into exile. He at first agreed and the White
House announced his departure on January 30th, but the next day he changed his mind,
unsure that he would really be protected, and stayed in Haiti. One month later he was
forced into exile in France by the military.
A more common, and in many ways more interesting strategy to induce dictators to
relinquish power is to try to structure political institutions so as to guarantee that they
will not be punished. Such institutional changes are sometimes important in transitions
to democracy. For example, President Pinochet was willing to abide by the results of
the 1989 plebiscite he lost in Chile because as a senator the Constitution protected him
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from prosecution. It was only when he left the country that he was vulnerable.
Although Pinochet’s experience illustrates an example of structuring political insti-
tutions to achieve commitment, to create durable institutions constraining future use
of political power is diﬃcult in practise. These diﬃculties are well illustrated by the
transition from white rule in Rhodesia to majority rule in Zimbabwe. Facing an un-
winable guerilla war, the white elite in Rhodesia sought to negotiate a transition of
majority rule, but with enough institutional safeguards that their rents would be pro-
tected. These safeguards included the electoral system they wanted, which was used
for the first post-independence elections, and massive over-representation in parliament
(Reynolds 1999, p. 163). Whites were guaranteed 20% of the seats in the legislature
for seven years despite making up only 2-3% of the population and were guaranteed 10
seats of the 40 seat senate. Clauses of the 1980 Constitution were also aimed at directly
guaranteeing the property rights of the whites. In particular land reform was outlawed
for 10 years after which it could only take place if compensated.
The white negotiators at the Lancaster House talks in 1979 that produced these agree-
ments understood that any promises made by the black majority negotiators about what
would happen after independence could not be believed. They sought therefore to find
a set of rules that would get around this problem (Herbst, 1990, pp. 13-36). Neverthe-
less, these guarantees were not enough to protect the property rights (and rents) of the
whites in anything other than the short run. The Mugabe regime quickly absorbed the
other factions from among the African guerilla opposition, and more moderate relatively
pro-white groups, such as Abel Muzorewa’s United African National Council, crumbled.
In 1985 the Mugabe regime switched back to the electoral system it preferred (Reynolds,
1999, p. 164) and in 1987, at the first possible opportunity, it removed the guaranteed
representation for whites. Though in 1987 Mugabe nominated white candidates for these
seats (Horowitz, 1991, pp. 135-136), this did not last for long. In 1990 the senate was
abolished. Finally, in 1990 the Constitution was amended to allow for the redistribution
of land. Since this time the Mugabe government has begun a sustained policy of land
redistribution away from whites through legal and extra-legal means.
6.2 Political losers
Another related source of ineﬃcient economic institutions arises from the desire of po-
litical elites to protect their political power. Political power is the source of the incomes,
rents, and privileges of the elite. If their political power were eroded, their rents would
decline. Consequently, the political elite should evaluate every potential economic change
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not only according to its economic consequences, such as its eﬀects on economic growth
and income distribution, but also according to its political consequences. Any economic
change that will erode the elites’ political power is likely to reduce their economic rents
in the long run.
As an example, imagine a change in economic institutions that will increase economic
growth, but in doing so, will also enrich groups that could potentially contest political
power in the future. Everything else equal, greater economic growth is good for those
holding political power. It will create greater returns on the assets that they possess,
and also greater incomes that they can tax or expropriate. However, if their potential
enemies are enriched, this also means greater threats against their power in the future.
Fearing these potential threats to their political power, the elites may oppose changes
in economic institutions that would stimulate economic growth.
That the threat of becoming a political loser impedes the adoption of better institu-
tions is again due to a commitment problem. If those who gained political power from
institutional change could promise to compensate those who lost power then there would
be no incentive to block better institutions.
There are many historical examples illustrating how the fear of losing political power
has led various groups of political and economic elites to oppose institutional change and
also introduction of new technologies. Perhaps the best documented examples come from
the attitude of the elites to industrialization during the nineteenth century (see Acemoglu
and Robinson, 2000b, 2002). There were large diﬀerences between the rates at which
countries caught up with British industrialization with many countries completely failing
to take advantage of the new technologies and opportunities. In most of these cases, the
attitudes of political elites towards industrialization, new technology and institutional
change appear to have been the decisive factor, and these attitudes were driven by their
fears of becoming political losers. These issues are best illustrated by the experiences of
Russia and Austria-Hungary.
In both Russia and Austria-Hungary, absolutist monarchies feared that promoting
industrialization would undermine their political power. In Russia, during the reign of
Nikolai I between 1825 and 1855 only one railway line was built in Russia, and this
was simply to allow the court to travel between Moscow and St. Petersburg. Economic
growth and the set of institutions that would have facilitated it were opposed since, as
Mosse (1992) puts it “it was understood that industrial development might lead to social
and political change.” In a similar vein, Gregory (1991) argues: “Prior to the about face
in the 1850’s, the Russian state feared that industrialization and modernization would
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concentrate revolution minded workers in cities, railways would give them mobility, and
education would create opposition to the monarchy.”
It was only after the defeat in the Crimean War that Nikolai’s successor, Alexsandr
II, initiated a large scale project of railway building and an attempt to modernize the
economy by introducing a western legal system, decentralizing government, and ending
feudalism by freeing the serfs. This period of industrialization witnessed heightened
political tensions, consistent with the fears of the elites that times of rapid change would
destabilize the political status quo and strengthen their opposition (McDaniel, 1988,
gives a detailed account of these events, see also Mosse, 1958).
The consensus view amongst historians also appears to be that the main explanation
for the slow growth of Austria-Hungary in the nineteenth century was lack of technol-
ogy adoption and institutional change, again driven by the opposition of the state to
economic change. This view was proposed by Gerschenkron who argued that the state
not only failed to promote industrialization, but rather, “economic progress began to
be viewed with great suspicion and the railroads came to be regarded, not as welcome
carriers of goods and persons, but as carriers of the dreaded revolution. Then the state
clearly became an obstacle to the economic development of the country” (1970, p. 89).
See also Gross (1973).
The analysis of Fruedenberger (1967, pp. 498-499) is similar. As with the Tsar,
the Hapsburg emperors opposed the building of railways and infrastructure and there
was no attempt to develop an eﬀective educational system. Blum (1943) pointed to the
pre-modern institutional inheritance as the major blockage to industrialization arguing
(p. 26) that
“these living forces of the traditional economic system were the greatest
barrier to development. Their chief supporter was ... Emperor Francis.
He knew that the advances in the techniques of production threatened the
life of the old order of which he was so determined a protector. Because
of his unique position as final arbiter of all proposals for change he could
stem the flood for a time. Thus when plans for the construction of a steam
railroad were put before him, he refused to give consent to their execution
‘lest revolution might come into the country’.”
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6.3 Economic losers
A distinct but related source of ineﬃciency stems from the basic supposition of the
social conflict view that diﬀerent economic institutions imply diﬀerent distributions of
incomes. This implies that a move from a bad to a better set of economic institutions
will make some people or groups worse oﬀ (and will not be Pareto improving). This in
turn implies that such groups will have an incentive to block or impede such institutional
changes even if they benefit the whole of society in some aggregate sense.
The idea that economic losers impede the choice of eﬃcient economic institutions
and economic policies is widespread in economics and was seen earliest in the literature
on international trade. Even though free trade may be socially desirable, individuals
invested in sectors in which an economy does not enjoy comparative advantage will lose
economically from free trade. Since at least the work of Schattshneider (1935) the role
of economic losers has been central in understanding why free trade is not adopted. In
the context of development economics, this idea was first discussed by Kuznets (1968),
developed at length by Olson (1982, 2000) and Mokyr (1990), and formalized by Krusell
and Rios-Rull (1996) and Parente and Prescott (1999). Most of the examples discussed
in the development literature on economic losers are about technological change–people
with specific investments in obsolete technology try to block the introduction of better
technology. The most celebrated example is the case of the Luddites, skilled weavers in
early nineteenth century England who smashed new mechanized looms which threatened
to lead to massive cuts in their wages (see Thomis, 1970, Randall, 1991). Scott (2000,
p. 200) relates a similar example from modern Malaysia, “When, in 1976, combine
harvesters began to make serious inroads into the wages of poor villagers, the entire
region experienced a rash of machine-breaking and sabotage reminiscent of the 1830’s
in England.”
That better economic institutions are blocked by individuals whose incomes are
threatened by such change is again due to a problem of commitment. If those whose
incomes rose when economic institutions changed could promise to compensate those
whose incomes fell then there would be no incentive to block better economic institu-
tions. Nevertheless, it is diﬃcult to commit to such transfers. To consider again the
example of the Luddites, the factory owners could have promised to pay the weavers high
wages in the future even though their skills were redundant. Once the new technology
was in place however, owners would have a clear incentive to fire the weavers and hire
44
much cheaper unskilled workers.11
Although the problem of economic losers is appealing at first sight, has received some
attention in the economics literature, and fits into our framework by emphasizing the
importance of commitment problems, we view it both theoretically and empirically less
important than the holdup and the political loser problems. First, as pointed out in Ace-
moglu and Robinson (2000b), in theories emphasizing issues of economic losers, there
are implicit assumptions about politics, which, when spelled out, imply that political
concerns must be important whenever issues of economic losers are present. The idea of
economic losers is that certain groups, fearing that they will lose their economic rents,
prevent adoption of beneficial economic institutions or technologies. The assumption in
this scenario is that these groups have the political power to block socially beneficial
changes. But then, if they have the political power to block change, why wouldn’t they
allow the change to take place and then use their political power to redistribute some of
the gains to themselves? The implicit assumption must therefore be that groups losing
economically also experience a reduction in their political power, making it impossible
for them to redistribute the gains to themselves after to change takes place. This rea-
soning therefore suggests that whether certain groups will lose economically or not is
not as essential to their attitudes towards change as whether their political power will be
eroded. Problems of political losers therefore seem much more important than problems
of economic losers.
Possibly for this reason, advocates of the economic losers view have been unable
to come up with any well documented examples where the economic losers hypothesis
can actually explain first-order patterns of development. For instance, while it is true
that the Luddites tried to break machines, they singularly failed to halt the progress of
agricultural technology in nineteenth century Britain. The same is true for Malaysia in
the 1970s, one of the fastest growing economies in the world at that time. Neither set
of workers had suﬃcient political power to stop change. Indeed, when political powerful
groups became economic losers, such as landowners in nineteenth century England who
saw land prices and agricultural rents fall rapidly after 1870, they did nothing to block
change because their political power allowed them to benefit from eﬃcient economic
institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2002).
11One possible way round this problem would be for the owners, if they could aﬀord it, to compensate
the weavers in advance for their lower future wages. But this would raise the reverse commitment
problem: the weavers would have an incentive to take the money and still break the machines — i.e.,
they could not commit to not blocking the innovations that would reduce their wages even after they
had taken the money.
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Perhaps the most interesting failure of economic losers to halt progress in English
economic history comes from the impact of the enclosure of common lands. Land has
not always been privately owned as property. In much of Africa land is still owned
communally, rather than individually, and this was true in Medieval Britain. Starting
around 1550 however an ‘enclosure movement’ gathered pace where ‘common land’ was
divided between cultivators and privatized. By 1850 this process of enclosures had made
practically all of Britain private property.
Enclosure was a heterogenous process (Overton 1996, p. 147) and it also took place
at diﬀerent times in diﬀerent places. Nevertheless, most of it was in two waves, the so
called ‘Tudor enclosures’ between 1550 and 1700 and the ‘parliamentary enclosures’ in
the century after 1750.
“From the mid-eighteenth century the most usual way in which common
rights were removed was through a specific act of parliament for the enclo-
sure of a particular locality. Such acts ... made the process easier because
enclosure could be secured provided the owners of a majority (four-fifths) of
the land, the lord of the manor, and the owner of the tithe agreed it should
take place. Thus the law of parliament (statue law) only took account of
the wishes of those owning land as opposed to the common law which took
account of all those who had both ownership rights and use rights to land.
Moreover ... in some parishes the ... majority could be held by a single
landowner ... parliamentary enclosure often resulted in a minority of own-
ers imposing their will on the majority of farmers.” Overton (1996, p. 158,
italics in original)
The historical evidence is unanimous that the incentive to enclose was because “en-
closed land was worth more than open common field land ... the general consensus has
been that rents doubled” Overton 1996, p. 162). More controversial is the source of
this increase in rent. Overton continues (pp. 162-163) “The proportion of profits taken
as rents from tenants by landlords is the outcome of a power struggle between the two
groups, and the increase in rent with enclosure may simply reflect an increase in land-
lord power.” Allen (1982, 1992) showed, in his seminal study of the enclosure movement
in the South Midlands, that the main impact was a large increase in agricultural rents
and a redistribution of income away from those cultivators who had previously used the
commons.
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The enclosure of common land thus led to a huge increase in inequality in early
modern England. Many peasants and rural dwellers had their traditional property rights
expropriated. In protest, groups of citizens dispossessed by enclosure attempted to
oppose it through collective action and riots–attempting to influence the exercise of
political power. These groups were no match for the British state, however. Kett’s
rebellion of 1549, the Oxfordshire rebellion of 1596, the Midland Revolt of 1607, and
others up to the Swing Riots of 1830-1831 were all defeated (see Charlesworth, 1983).
The presence of economic losers did not prevent this huge change in economic institutions
and income distribution.
6.4 The Inseparability of Efficiency and Distribution
Commitment problems in the use and the allocation of political power therefore intro-
duce a basic trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and distribution. For example, when lack of
commitment causes hold-ups, those who hold political power know that people will not
have the right incentives to invest so growth will be low. In response to this, they might
voluntarily give away their power or try to create political institutions that restricted
their power. Such a change in political institutions would create better investment incen-
tives. Though this situation is hypothetically possible and has formed the basis for some
theories of institutional change (e.g. Barzel, 2001) it appears to be insignificant in real-
ity. Even faced with severe underinvestment, political elites are reluctant to give away
their power because of its distributional implications, i.e., because this would reduce
their ability to extract rents from the rest of society. Thus poor economic institutions,
here lack of property rights and hold-up, persist in equilibrium because to solve the
problem, holders of political power have to voluntarily constrain their power or give it
away. This may increase the security of property in society and increase incentives to
invest, but it also undermines the ability of rulers to extract rents. They may be better
oﬀ with a large slice of a small pie.
Similar phenomena are at work when there are either political or economic losers. In
the first case, namely a situation where political power holders anticipate being political
losers, promoting good institutions directly reduces the political power and rents of
incumbents and a similar trade-oﬀ emerges. Adopting eﬃcient economic institutions will
stimulate growth, but when the political status quo is simultaneously eroded the amount
of rent accruing to the initially powerful may fall. In the second case, the incomes of
those with political power to determine economic institutions falls directly when better
economic institutions are introduced. In the absence of credible commitments to side-
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payments, those whose incomes fall when better economic institutions are introduced
have an incentive to block such institutions.
Because commitment problems seem so endemic in collective choice and politics, it
seems natural to believe that institutional change has significant distributional conse-
quences and as a result there will be conflict over the set of institutions in society.
6.5 Comparative Statics
Our analysis so far has made some progress towards our theory of diﬀerences in economic
institutions. Although our full theory is yet to be developed in the later sections, the
diﬀerent mechanisms discussed in this section already point out the major comparative
static implications of our approach regarding when economic institutions protecting the
property rights of a broad cross-section of society are likely to be adopted, and when
they are likely to be opposed and blocked. We now briefly discuss these comparative
statics.
Hold-up, political loser and economic loser considerations lead to some interesting
comparative static results which can be derived by considering the political institutions
that lie behind these phenomena.
1. First, the perspective of hold-ups immediately suggests that situations in which
there are constraints on the use of political power, for example, because there is
a balance of political power in society or a form of separation of powers between
diﬀerent power-holders, are more likely to engender an environment protecting the
property rights of a broad cross-section of society. When political elites cannot use
their political power to expropriate the incomes and assets of others, even groups
outside the elite may have relatively secure property rights. Therefore, constraints
and checks on the use of political power by the elite are typically conducive to the
emergence of better economic institutions
2. Second, a similar reasoning implies that economic institutions protecting the rights
of a broad cross-section are more likely to arise when political power is in the hands
of a relatively broad group containing those with access to the most important in-
vestment opportunities. When groups holding political power are narrower, they
may protect their own property rights, and this might encourage their own invest-
ments, but the groups outside the political elites are less likely to receive adequate
protection for their investments (see Acemoglu, 2003b).
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3. Third, good economic institutions are more likely to arise and persist when there
are only limited rents that power holders can extract from the rest of society, since
such rents would encourage them to opt for a set of economic institutions that
make the expropriation of others possible.
4. Finally, considerations related to issues of political losers suggest that institutional
reforms that do not threaten the power of incumbents are more likely to succeed.
Therefore, institutional changes that do not strengthen strong opposition groups
or destabilize the political situation are more likely to be adopted.
6.6 The Colonial Experience in Light of the Comparative Statics
We now briefly return to the colonial experience, and discuss how the comparative statics
discussed here shed light on the diﬀerences in economic institutions across the former
colonies and the institutional reversal.
The second comparative static result above suggests a reason why better economic
institutions developed in places where Europeans settled. In these societies, a relatively
broad-based group of Europeans came to dominate political power, and they opted for a
set of economic institutions protecting their own property rights. In contrast, in places
where Europeans did not settle, especially where they were a small minority relative to a
large indigenous population, they did not have the incentives to develop good economic
institutions because such institutions would have made it considerably more diﬃcult for
them to extract resources from the rest of society.
The third comparative static suggests an important reason why in places with more
wealth, resources and also a high density of indigenous population to be exploited,
Europeans were more likely to opt for worse institutions, without any protection for the
majority of the population, again because such institutions facilitated the extraction of
resources by the Europeans.
The first comparative static result, in turn, is related to the persistence of the diﬀerent
types of economic institutions that Europeans established, or maintained, in diﬀerent
colonies. In colonies where Europeans settled in large numbers, they also developed
political institutions placing eﬀective checks on economic and political elites. In contrast,
the political institutions in colonies with high population density, extractive systems of
production, and few Europeans, concentrated power in the hands of the elite, and built a
state apparatus designed to use coercion against the majority of the population. These
diﬀerent political institutions naturally implied diﬀerent constraints on political and
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economic elites. In the former set of colonies, there were constraints on the development
of economic institutions that would favor a few at the expense of the majority. Such
constraints were entirely absent in the latter set of colonies.
Finally, the fourth comparative static is useful in thinking about why many colonies
did not attempt to change their economic institutions during the nineteenth century
when new economic opportunities made their previous system based on forced labor,
slavery, or tribute-taking much less beneficial relative to one encouraging investment in
industry and commerce. Part of the answer appears to lie in the fact that the political
power of the elites, for example of the plantation owners in the Caribbean, was intimately
linked to the existing economic system. A change in the economic system would turn
them into political losers, an outcome they very much wanted to avoid.
6.7 Reassessment of the Social Conflict View
So far we have shown that the econometric evidence is convincing that diﬀerences in
economic institutions are the root cause of diﬀerences in prosperity. We then argued
that although there are diﬀerent approaches which can account for variation in economic
institutions, the most plausible approach is the social conflict view. Though we believe
that there are clear instances where history and ideology matter for the institutional
structure of society, and clearly institutions are highly persistent, the most promising
approach to understanding why diﬀerent countries have diﬀerent institutions is to focus
on choices and their subsequent consequences. The social conflict view emphasizes the
distributional implication of economic institutions and how commitment problems imply
that eﬃciency and distribution cannot be separated. Hence the fundamental conflict
within society over the nature of economic institutions has important implications for
economic performance. Some economic institutions will promote growth, but they will
not necessarily benefit all groups in society. Alternative economic institutions may
induce economic stagnation, but may nevertheless enrich some groups. Which set of
institutions results and whether or not a society prospers will be determined by which
of these groups has the political power to get the institutions that diﬀerentially benefit
them. At this point we have therefore substantiated the first three points we made in
the introduction. To develop our theory of economic institutions further we need to be
more specific about political power–where it comes from and why some people have
it and not others. We undertake this task in section 8. Before doing this however the
next section discusses three important historical examples of the evolution of economic
institutions. We use these examples to show the explanatory power of the social conflict
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view and to begin to illustrate in concrete settings how political power works.
7 The Social Conflict View in Action
We now discuss three important examples to bring out the fact that conflict over eco-
nomic institutions is critical to the functioning of the economy and that this conflict
stems, not from diﬀerences in beliefs, ideology or historical accidents, but from the im-
pact of economic institutions on distribution. The examples also show that those with
political power have a disproportionate eﬀect on economic institutions and they show
how the distribution of political power is influenced by diﬀerent factors. These factors
include the allocation of de jure political power through the structure of political insti-
tutions and the ability of groups to solve the collective action problem, or exercise what
we called de facto political power. With these examples in mind in section 8 we move
to discuss in more detail the nature and sources of political power.
7.1 Labor Markets
A market–an opportunity for individuals to exchange a commodity or service–is ob-
viously a fundamental economic institution relevant for development. As Adam Smith
(1776) argued, markets allow individuals to take advantage of the benefits of special-
ization and the division of labor, and scholars such as Pirenne (1937) and Hicks (1969)
argued that the expansion of markets was perhaps the driving forces in long-run devel-
opment.
In the history of Europe a key transformation was from feudal labor market insti-
tutions towards modern notions of a free labor market where individuals were able to
decide who to work for and where to live. This process of institutional change was inti-
mately connected to the transition from a whole set of feudal economic institutions to
the economic institutions we think of as ‘capitalist.’ Most historians see this as key to the
economic take-oﬀ that began in the nineteenth century. It was the countries which had
made the transition away from feudalism most completely, such as England, the Nether-
lands and France, thanks to the revolution of 1789, which developed most rapidly. It
was those where feudalism was still in operation, such as Russia and Austria-Hungary,
which lagged far behind.
What can account for this diﬀerential evolution of feudalism? Scholars beginning
with Postan (1937) saw the demographic collapse caused by the black death in the 1340’s
as demolishing feudalism in Western Europe. By dramatically altering the land/labor
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ratio as approximately 40% of the population of Europe died (e.g., Cantor, 2001), the
Black Death greatly increased the bargaining power of peasants and allowed them to
negotiate a free status ending feudal obligations, particularly with respect to labor.
Therefore, Postan’s demographic theory implicitly emphasizes the role of political power
in the decline of feudalism: this set of economic institutions started to disappear when
the political power of the peasants increased and that of lords declined.
In fact, the distribution of power may be even more important in the whole story than
Postan’s theory suggests. As first pointed out by Brenner (1976), the demographic the-
ory of the decline feudalism is not consistent with the comparative evidence. Although
demographic trends were similar all over Europe and
“it is true that ... in most of Western Europe serfdom was dead by the
early sixteenth century. On the other hand, in Eastern Europe, in particular
Pomerania, Brandenburg, East Prussia and Poland, decline in population
from the late fourteenth century was accompanied by an ultimately successful
movement towards imposing extra-economic controls, that is serfdom, over
what had been, until then, one of Europe’s freest peasantries. By 1500 the
same Europe-wide trends had gone a long way towards establishing one of
the great divides in European history, the emergence of an almost totally free
peasant population in Western Europe, the debasement of the peasantry to
unfreedom in Eastern Europe.” (Brenner, 1976, p. 41).
What can explain these divergent outcomes? Brenner notes (p. 51): “It was the
logic of the peasant to try to use his apparently improved bargaining position to get his
freedom. It was the logic of the landlord to protect his position by reducing the peasants’
freedom.” The outcome “obviously came down to a question of power” (p. 51); whether
the peasants or the lords had more political power determined whether serfdom declined
or became stronger.
Although we are far from an understanding of the determinants of the relative struc-
ture of political power in diﬀerent parts of Europe, Brenner suggests that an important
element was the “patterns of the development of the contending agrarian classes and
their relative strength in the diﬀerent European societies: their relative levels of in-
ternal solidarity, their self-consciousness and organization, and their general political
resources–especially their relationships to the non-agricultural classes (in particular,
potential urban class allies) and to the state” (p. 52). To substantiate this view, Bren-
ner studies how villages tended to be organized diﬀerently in Eastern Europe, there was
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“more of a tendency to individualistic farming; less developed organization of collabo-
rative agricultural practices at the level of the village or between villages; and little of
the tradition of the ‘struggle for commons rights’ against the lords which was so charac-
teristic of western development” (p. 57). This diﬀerential organization was due to the
process of initial occupation of these Eastern lands.
Although many parts of Brenner’s analysis remain controversial, there is general
agreement that the decline of feudalism and the transformation of European labor mar-
kets were intimately related to the political power of the key groups with opposing
interests, the peasants and the lords (see, for example, Aston and Philpin, 1985, on
reactions to Brenner’s interpretation). Feudal institutions, by restricting labor mobility
and by removing the role of the labor market in allocating labor to jobs, undermined
incentives and resulted in underdevelopment. But these same economic institutions cre-
ated large rents for the aristocracy. As a consequence, aristocracies all over Europe
attempted to maintain them. It was when their political power weakened that the
process of transformation got underway.
7.2 Financial Markets
Much recent work on growth and development has focused on capital markets. Growth
requires investment, so poor agents without access to financial markets will not have
the resources to invest. Empirically many scholars have found correlations between
the depth of financial markets and growth (see Levine, 2004) and absence of financial
markets is at the heart of ambitious theories of comparative development by Banerjee
and Newman (1993) and Galor and Zeira (1993).
If the stress on financial markets and financial intermediation is correct, a central
issue is to understand why financial systems diﬀer. For example, studies of the devel-
opment of banking in the United States in the nineteenth century demonstrate a rapid
expansion of financial intermediation which most scholars see as a crucial facilitator of
the rapid growth and industrialization that the economy experienced. In his recent study
Haber (2001, p. 9) found that in the United States, “In 1818 there were 338 banks in
operation, with a total capital of $160 million-roughly three times as many banks and
bank capital as in 1810. Circa 1860, the United States had 1,579 banks, with a total
capital of $422.5 million. Circa 1914 there were 27,864 banks in the United States. Total
bank assets totaled $27.3 billion.”
One might see this rapid expansion of banking and financial services as a natural
feature. Yet Haber (2001) shows that the situation was very diﬀerent in Mexico (p. 24).
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“Mexico had a series of segmented monopolies that were awarded to a group of insiders.
The outcome, circa 1910 could not have been more diﬀerent: the United States had
roughly 25,000 banks and a highly competitive market structure; Mexico had 42 banks,
two of which controlled 60 percent of total banking assets, and virtually none of which
actually competed with another bank.”
The explanation for this huge diﬀerence is not obvious. The relevant technology was
certainly readily available everywhere and it is diﬃcult to see why the various types of
moral hazards or adverse selection issues connected with financial intermediation should
have limited the expansion of banks in Mexico but not the United States. Haber then
shows that (p. 9), “at the time that the U.S. Constitution was put into eﬀect in 1789, ...
[U.S. banking] was characterized by a series of segmented monopolies that shared rents
with state governments via taxes or state ownership of bank stock. In some cases, banks
also shared rents directly with the legislators who regulated them.”
This structure, which looked remarkably like that which arose subsequently in Mex-
ico, emerged because state governments had been stripped of revenues by the Consti-
tution. In response, states started banks as a way to generate tax revenues. State
governments restricted entry “in order to maximize the amount of rent earned by banks,
rent which would then be shared with the state government in the form of dividends,
stock distributions, or taxes of various types.”
Thus in the early nineteenth century, U.S. banks evolved as monopolies with regula-
tions aimed at maximizing revenues for the state governments. Yet this system did not
last because states began competing among themselves for investment and migrants.
“The pressure to hold population and business in the state was reinforced
by a second, related, factor: the broadening of the suﬀrage. By the 1840s,
most states had dropped all property and literacy requirements, and by 1850
virtually all states (with some minor exceptions) had done so. The broaden-
ing of the suﬀrage, however, served to undermine the political coalitions that
supported restrictions on the number of bank charters. That is, it created
a second source of political competition-competition within states over who
would hold oﬃce and the policies they would enact.”
The situation was very diﬀerent in Mexico. After 50 years of endemic political in-
stability the country unified under the highly centralized 40 year dictatorship of Porfirio
Diaz until the Revolution in 1910.
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In Haber’s argument political institutions in the United States allocated political
power to people who wanted access to credit and loans. As a result they forced state
governments to allow free competitive entry into banking. In Mexico political institutions
were very diﬀerent. There were no competing federal states and the suﬀrage was highly
restrictive. As a result the central government granted monopoly rights to banks who
restricted credit to maximize profits. The granting of monopolies turned out to be
a rational way for the government to raise revenue and redistribute rents to political
supporters (see North, 1981, Chapter 3).
A priori, it is possible that the sort of market regulation Haber found in Mexico might
have been socially desirable. Markets never function in a vacuum, but rather within sets
of rules and regulations which help them to function. Yet it is hard to believe that
this argument applies to Mexico (see also Maurer, 2002). Haber (2001) documents that
market regulation was aimed not at solving market failures and it is precisely during
this period that the huge economic gap between the United States and Mexico opened
up (on which see Coatsworth, 1993, Engerman and Sokoloﬀ, 1997). Indeed, Haber and
Maurer (2004) examined in detail how the structure of banking influenced the Mexican
textile industry between 1880 and 1913. They showed that only firms with personal
contacts with banks were able to get loans. They conclude (p. 5):
“Our analysis demonstrates that textile mills that were related to banks
were less profitable and less technically eﬃcient than their competitors. Nev-
ertheless, access to bank credit allowed them to grow faster, become larger,
and survive longer than their more productive competitors. The implication
for growth is clear: relatively productive firms lost market share to relatively
unproductive (but bank-related) competitors.”
Despite the fact that economic eﬃciency was hurt by regulations, those with the
political power were able to sustain these regulations.
7.3 Regulation of Prices
As our final example we turn to the regulation of prices in agricultural markets (which is
intimately related to the set of agricultural policies adopted by governments). The semi-
nal study of agricultural price regulation in Africa and Latin America is by Bates (1981,
1989, 1997). Bates (1981) demonstrated that poor agricultural performance in Ghana,
Nigeria and Zambia was due to government controlled marketing boards systematically
paying farmers prices for their crops much below world levels.
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“Most African states possess publicly sanctioned monopsonies for the pur-
chase and export of agricultural goods ... These agencies, bequeathed to the
governments of the independent states by their colonial predecessors, pur-
chase cash crops for export at administratively determined domestic prices,
and then sell them at the prevailing world market prices. By using their
market power to keep the price paid to the farmer below the price set by
the world market, they accumulate funds from the agricultural sector” Bates
(1981, p. 12).
The marketing boards made surpluses which were given to the government as a form
of taxation. Bates (1981, p. 15) notes
“A major test of the intentions of the newly independent governments
occurred ... [when] between 1959-1960 and 1961-62, the world price of cocoa
fell approximately $50 a ton. If the resources generated by the marketing
agencies were to be used to stabilize prices, then surely this was the time to
use the funds for that purpose. Instead ... the governments of both Ghana
and Nigeria passed on the full burden of the drop in price to the producers.”
Bates continues “Using the price setting power of the monopsonistic marketing agen-
cies, the states have therefore made the producers of cash crops a significant part of their
tax base, and have taken resources from them without compensation in the form of in-
terest payments or of goods and services returned.” (pp. 181-9). As a result of this
pernicious taxation, reaching up to 70% of the value of the crop in Ghana in the 1970’s,
investment in agriculture collapsed as did output of cocoa and other crops. In poor coun-
tries with comparative advantage in agriculture such a situation mapped into negative
rates of economic growth.
Why were resources extracted in this way? Though part of the motivation was to
promote industrialization, the main one is to generate resources that could be either
expropriated or redistributed to maintain power
“governments face a dilemma: urban unrest, which they cannot success-
fully eradicate through co-optation or repression, poses a serious challenge
to their interests ... Their response has been to try to appease urban inter-
ests not by oﬀering higher money wages but by advocating policies aimed at
reducing the cost of living, and in particular the cost of food. Agricultural
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policy thus becomes a by-product of political relations between governments
and urban constituents” (1981, p. 33)
In contrast to the situation in Ghana, Zambia and Nigeria, Bates (1981, 1989, 1997)
showed that agricultural policy in Kenya and Colombia over this period was much more
pro-farmer. The diﬀerence was due to who controlled the marketing board. In Kenya,
farmers were not smallholders, as they were in Ghana, Nigeria and Zambia, and con-
centrated landownership made it much easier to solve the collective action problem.
Moreover, farming was important in the Kikuyu areas, an ethnic group closely related
to the ruling political party, KANU, under Jomo Kenyatta (Bates, 1981, p. 122). Farm-
ers in Kenya therefore formed a powerful lobby and were able to guarantee themselves
high prices. Even though the government of Kenya engaged in land reform after inde-
pendence
“80% of the former white highlands were left intact and ... the government
took elaborate measures to preserve the integrity of the large-scale farms
... [which] readily combine in defense of their interests. One of the most
important collective eﬀorts is the Kenya National Farmer’s Union (KNFU)
... The organization ... is dominated by the large-scale farmers .. [but] it can
be argued that the KNFU helps to create a framework of public policies that
provides an economic environment favorable to all farmers” Bates (1981, pp.
93-94).
Bates concludes (p. 95) that in Kenya
“large farmers ... have secured public policies that are highly favorable
by comparison to those in other nations. Elsewhere the agrarian sector is
better blessed by the relative absence of inequality. But is also deprived of
the collective benefits which inequality, ironically, can bring.”
In Colombia, farmers were favored because of competition for their votes from the
two main political parties. Bates (1997, p. 54) notes
“Being numerous and small, Colombia’s coﬀee producers, like peasants
elsewhere, encountered formidable costs of collective action. In most similar
instances such diﬃculties have rendered smallholders politically powerless.
And yet ... Colombia’s peasants elicited favorable policies from politicians,
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who at key moments themselves bore the costs of collective action, provision-
ing the coﬀee sector with economic institutions and delegating public power
to coﬀee interests.”
How could the coﬀee growers gain such leverage over national policy?
“A major reason they could do so ... is because the structure of political
institutions, and in particular the structure of party competition, rendered
them pivotal, giving them the power over the political fortunes of those
with ambition for oﬃce and enabling them to make or break governments.
They thereby gained the power to defeat government oﬃcials who sought to
orchestrate or constrain their behavior.” Bates (1997, p.51, 54)
A telling piece of evidence in favor of this thesis is that during the 1950’s when a civil
war broke out between the two parties, there was five years of military rule and policy
turned decisively again the coﬀee growers, only to switch back again with the peaceful
resumption of democracy in 1958.
7.4 Political Power and Economic Institutions
These three examples of the creation of economic institutions have certain features in
common. All these institutions, labor market regulation/feudalism, the rules governing
financial market development, and agricultural price regulation, clearly reflect the out-
come of conscious choices. Feudalism did not end in England for incidental or ideological
reasons, but because those who were controlled and impoverished by feudal regulations
struggled to abolish them. In Eastern Europe the same struggle took place but with
a diﬀerent outcome. Similarly, Mexico did not end up with diﬀerent financial institu-
tions than the United States by accident, because of diﬀerent beliefs about what an
eﬃcient banking system looked like, or because of some historical factor independent of
the outcome. The same is true for diﬀerences in economic policies in Kenya and Ghana.
Moreover, diﬀerent sets of economic institutions arising in diﬀerent places cannot be
argued to be eﬃcient adaptations to diﬀerent environments. Most historians believe
that the persistence of feudal institutions in Eastern Europe well into the nineteenth
century explains why it lagged far behind Western Europe in economic development.
The diﬀerence between the financial institutions of Mexico and the United States also
plausibly played a role in explaining why they diverged economically in the nineteenth
century. The same holds with respect to agricultural price regulation.
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The driving force behind all three examples is that economic institutions are chosen
for their distributional consequences. Which specific economic institutions emerge de-
pends on who is able to get their way–who has political power. In England, peasant
communities had developed relatively strong local political institutions and were able
to consolidate on the shock of the Black Death to put an end to feudal regulations. In
Eastern Europe it was the lords who had relatively more power and they were able to
intensify feudalism in the face of the same demographic shock (as Domar, 1970, pointed
out, the Black Death actually made serfdom more attractive to the lords even if at the
same time it increased the bargaining power of the peasants). In the case of bank-
ing in the nineteenth century, Haber’s research shows while the authoritarian regime
in Mexico had the political power to freely create monopolies and create rents in the
banking industry, the United States was diﬀerent because it was federal and much more
democratic. The political institutions of the United States prevented politicians from
appropriating the rents that could flow from the creation of monopolies. Finally, in
Bates’s analysis, distortionary price regulations arose in Ghana and Zambia, but not in
Kenya and Colombia, because in the latter countries agricultural producers had more
political power and so could prevent the distortionary policies that would harm their
interests.
It is also useful to consider in the context of these examples the mechanisms we dis-
cussed in section 6 which underlie the adoption of ineﬃcient economic institutions. Why
couldn’t the peasants and lords of feudal Europe negotiate and allow the introduction
of a set of economic institutions that would have given peasants incentives to innovate
and would have allowed for the eﬃcient allocation of labor? Why couldn’t either the
lords have promised not to expropriate any benefits that accrued from innovation, or al-
ternatively the peasants agreed to compensate the lords if feudal labor institutions were
abolished? Though it is diﬃcult to find direct evidence on such counterfactuals from
the Medieval period, the most plausible explanation is that such ‘deals’ were impossible
to make credible. The political power of the lords was intimately connected to feudal
institutions and thus dismantling these would not only have increased peasant incentives
to innovate, but would also have dramatically altered the balance of political power and
the distribution of rents in society. Moreover, under feudal regulations peasants were
tied to the land. The introduction of free labor mobility would have given workers an
exit option, thus increasing their bargaining power with the lords over the division of
output. Thus lords might anticipate being both political and economic losers from the
ending of feudalism, even if total output would have increased.
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In the case of agricultural price regulation, similar arguments are plausible. Cocoa
farmers in Ghana would not have believed promises by governments that they would not
expropriate the fruits of higher investment, and the governments themselves would not
have believed promises by the farmers to compensate them if they left oﬃce. Moreover,
eﬃcient sets of economic institutions in Ghana or Nigeria would have strengthened the
economic base of the rural sector at the expense of the political power of the then
dominant urban sector. Indeed, for Ghana in the 1960’s, we have direct evidence from
the urban economy that the threat of being a political loser led to ineﬃcient economic
institutions. This emerges in the analysis of Killick (1978, p. 37) of the attempt by the
government of Kwame Nkrumah to promote industrialization. Killick notes:
“Even had there been the possibility [of creating an indigenous entrepre-
neurial class] it is doubtful that Nkrumah would have wanted to create such a
class, for reasons of ideology and political power. He was very explicit about
this saying ‘we would be hampering our advance to socialism if we were to
encourage the growth of Ghanian private capitalism in our midst.’ There
is evidence that he also feared the threat that a wealthy class of Ghanaian
businessmen might pose to his own political power.”
Further evidence on the importance of political loser considerations comes from E.
Ayeh-Kumi one of Nkrumah’s main economic advisers who noted after the coup that
Nkrumah (Killick, 1978, p. 60): “informed me that if he permitted African business
to grow, it will grow to becoming a rival power to his and the party’s prestige, and he
would do everything to stop it, which he actually did.”
In this context, it is interesting that Nkrumah’s solution to consolidate his power
was to limit the size of businesses that Ghanaians could own. This caused problems
for his industrialization policy which he got round by allowing foreign businessmen to
enter Ghana. Though this was inconsistent with his aggressively nationalistic and anti-
imperialistic rhetoric, these businessmen did not pose a domestic political threat. Killick
(p. 37) notes “Given Nkrumah’s desire to keep Ghanaian private businesses small,
his argument that ‘Capital investment must be sought from abroad since there is no
bourgeois class amongst us to carry on the necessary investment’ was disingenuous. He
goes on to add that, (p. 40) Nkrumah “had no love of foreign capitalists but he preferred
to encourage them rather than local entrepreneurs, whom he wished to restrict”.
All these examples show that the distribution of political power in society is crucial
for explaining when economic institutions are good and when they are bad. But where
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does political power come from and who has political power? In addressing these ques-
tions we will develop our theory of economic institutions. In a theory based on social
conflict where economic institutions are endogenous, it will be to diﬀerences in political
institutions and the distribution of political power that we must look to explain variation
in economic institutions.
8 A Theory of Institutions
8.1 Sources of Political Power
Who has political power and where does it come from? As we noted in the Introduction
(section 1.2, point 4), political power comes from two sources. First, an individual or
group can be allocated de jure power by political institutions. But institutions are not the
only source of power. A second type of political power accrues to individuals or groups
if they can solve the collective action problem, create riots, revolts, or demonstrations,
own guns, etc.. We call this type of power de facto political power (see Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2003, chapter 5).
Actual political power is the composition, the joint outcome, of de jure and de facto
power. To see how this works out in practice, consider the situation in Chile in the early
1970’s. Salvador Allende was elected President with a majority of the popular vote. The
formal political institutions of democracy in Chile allocated power to him to propose
legislation, issue decrees, etc. Consequently, even though he did not have an absolute
majority in congress, Allende had a great deal of de jure political power. Political power
is not just de jure however; it does not simply stem from political institutions. Allende,
despite being empowered under the Chilean Constitution, was overthrown by a military
coup in 1973. Here, the military under the leadership of General Pinochet, were able to
use brute force and guns to over-ride the formal political institutions. The ability to use
force is one example of de facto political power.
As we suggested in the introduction, the relationship between political power and
economic and political institutions is complex and dynamic. Consider the example we
discussed in section 7.2, the research by Haber on the comparative financial evolution
of Mexico and the United States in the nineteenth century. Haber traced the diﬀerent
evolution of economic institutions to diﬀerences in initial political institutions. These
political institutions led to diﬀerent distributions of power and this was critical for the
emergence of good financial institutions in the United States, whereby those who bene-
fitted from a competitive banking industry were able to force politicians to provide the
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rules which would guarantee it. But where did these diﬀerences in political institutions
come from? These diﬀerences were partly a result of political events in the nineteenth
century, and partially a result of diﬀerent colonial political institutions. In the United
States, during the initial phase of colonization in the early seventeenth century. Very low
population density and lack of easily exploitable resources forced colonizing companies
and the British state to make both economic and political concessions; they granted
the settlers access to land and accepted the formation of representative democratic in-
stitutions (Morgan, 1975). Consequently, even at independence the United States had
relatively democratic political institutions (Keyssar, 2000). Moreover, the initial egali-
tarian distribution of assets and the high degree of social mobility made for a situation
where, at least in the northern states, the distribution of economic resources, and thus
de facto power, was relatively equal. The relatively representative political institutions
therefore persisted and were supported by the balance of de facto power in society.
In Mexico there were very diﬀerent initial conditions during the colonial period with
a large indigenous population and rich silver mines to exploit. This led to a much more
hierarchical and authoritarian balance of political power and very diﬀerent colonial eco-
nomic institutions (see Engerman and Sokoloﬀ, 1997, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson,
2004). These conditions fed into the diﬀerent institutional structures at independence,
the United States with its constitution, checks and balances and federalism, Mexico with
its much more centralized, unchecked, unbalanced and absolutist state. These diﬀerent
political institutions then led to very diﬀerent economic institutions and economic out-
comes after independence. Thus, in some ultimate sense, the source of diﬀerent political
institutions were diﬀerent initial conditions during the colonial period.
Consider now the evidence presented by Bates. Agricultural policies were better in
Kenya because large farmers could solve the collective action problem and exercise de
facto political power. But the main reason for the existence of large farms was that
British settlers expropriated the land from Africans during the expansion of colonialism
(see Berman and Lonsdale, 1992). Thus previous combinations of formal political in-
stitutions (colonial institutions) and de facto power (the military might of the British
Empire) determined economic institutions, feeding into the future distribution of de facto
power even after the nature of de jure power changed dramatically with independence.
We can now see that these examples substantiate the dynamic model that we sketched
in section 1.2. There we showed that at any date, political power is shaped by political
institutions, which determine de jure power, and the inherited distribution of resources,
which aﬀect the balance of de facto power. Political power then determines economic
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institutions and economic performance. It also influences the future evolution of politi-
cal power and prosperity. Economic institutions determine the distribution of resources
at that point, which, in turn, influences the distribution of de facto power in the future.
Similarly, the distribution of power at any point determines not just the economic insti-
tutions then, but also the future political institutions. Thus the allocation of political
power at one date, because of the way it influences the distribution of resources and
future political institutions, has a crucial eﬀect on the future allocation of both de facto
and de jure political power.
Both the comparison Haber made between Mexico and the United States, and that
which Bates made between Ghana, Zambia, Kenya and Colombia illustrate this diagram
in action. They show how political institutions and de facto power combine to generate
diﬀerent set of economic institutions, how these institutions determine both the distrib-
ution of resources and the growth rate of the economy, and how power and institutions
evolve over time, often in ways that tend to reinforce particular initial conditions.
8.2 Political Power and Political Institutions
The examples we discussed above showed how political power depends on political insti-
tutions and de facto power, and how this determines economic institutions. Moreover,
we saw that at any time the pre-existing economic institutions will be an important
determinant of the distribution of de facto power. The final element to emphasize is
how political institutions evolve over time and how they influence the distribution of
political power.
To see why political institutions are so important as a source of political power think
of a situation where a group, say the Chilean army in the early 1970’s, has a great
deal of de facto power. Indeed, it has so much de facto power that it can overrule the
Chilean Constitution, making the political institutions largely irrelevant. In fact in Chile
the de facto power of the military was able to overthrow the legitimate government and
completely reverse the economic policies and economic institutions chosen by the Allende
government (including land reform and mass nationalization of industry). Not only did
the military reverse the economic institutions preferred by Allende and the groups who
elected him, they then implemented their own preferred set of economic institutions, in
particularly deregulating the trade regime and the economy. Yet the Pinochet regime
was heavily concerned with formal political institutions, and in 1980 Pinochet re-wrote
the constitution.
If de facto power was decisive in Chile what is the role for political institutions? If
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the constitution can be overthrown, why bother to re-write it? The secret to this lies
in the intrinsically transitory nature of de facto power.12 Yes, the military were able
to organize a coup in 1973 but this was only because times were uniquely propitious.
There was a world-wide economic crisis, and factions of the military that opposed the
coup could be marginalized. Moreover, the United States government at the time was
happy to encourage and endorse the overthrow of a socialist government, even if it had
been democratically elected. The coming together of such circumstances could not be
expected to happen continually, hence once Chilean society re-democratized, as it did
after 1990, the military would not be able to continually threaten a coup. In response to
this Pinochet changed the political institutions in order to attempt to lock in the power
of the military, and thus the economic institutions that he/they preferred. Therefore,
the important role for political institutions is that they influence the future allocation
of political power. This dynamic role is crucial because it explains the major desire of
agents to change political institutions when they get the chance–this is how they can
attempt to enduringly alter the balance of political power in their favor (see Acemoglu
and Robinson, 2003).
8.3 A Theory of Political Institutions
We now have in place the outlines of our theory of institutions. There are seven points
to emphasize, paralleling the discussion in section 1.2 and our diagrammatic exposition
there. First, individuals have preferences over economic institutions because of the
allocation of resources that these institutions induce.
Second, peoples’ preferences typically do not agree because eﬃciency and distribu-
tion cannot be separated. Diﬀerent economic institutions will benefit diﬀerent groups,
and this will determine the preferences of these individuals and groups with respect to
economic institutions.
Third, the problem of commitment explains why eﬃciency and distribution are insep-
arable. Economic institutions are collective choices, and they are chosen and sustained
12The empirical literature on the collective action problem has recognized that the diﬃculty of solving
the collective action problems lead collective action to typically be transitory. Lichbach (1995, p. 17)
notes “collective action, if undertaken on a short-term basis, may indeed occur; collective action that
requires long periods to time does not ... Given that most people’s commitments to particular causes face
inevitable decline, most dissident groups are ephemeral, most dissident campaigns brief.” This transitory
nature of collective action is echoed by Tarrow (1991, p. 15) who notes “the exhaustion of mass political
involvement,” while Ross and Gurr (1989, p. 414) discuss political “burnout.” Similarly, Hardin (1995,
p. 18) argues that “the extensive political participation of civil society receives enthusiastic expression
only in moments of state collapse or great crisis. It cannot be maintained at a perpetually high level.”
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by the state. Since there is no third party to enforce the decisions of the state, problems
of commitment are particularly severe in the political realm.
Fourth, the equilibrium structure of economic institutions will therefore be deter-
mined by who has the power to get their way, i.e., who can create and sustain economic
institutions that benefit themselves. The distribution of political power thus determines
economic institutions, the allocation of resources and the rate of economic growth.
Fifth, political power has two forms: de jure power determined by the political
institutions, such as the constitution and the electoral rules, and de facto power, which
stems from the ability to solve the collective action problem, mobilize weapons etc.. De
facto power can influence political outcomes independently of the political institutions,
and its distribution often critically determines how a given set of institutions works in
practice and whether or not they are actually obeyed.
Sixth, the distribution of de facto political power at any date is influenced to a large
degree by the distribution of resources in society, since those with greater resources can
command more power both through legitimate and intimate means, and perhaps can
also solve the collective action problem more eﬃciently. Naturally, the distribution of
resources at this point is influenced by economic institutions and economic outcomes in
the past.
Finally, political institutions are also endogenous; the current balance of political
power, incorporating both de jure and de facto elements, also determines future political
institutions. Political institutions are important because they allocate, at least within
the limits defined by the exercise of future de facto power, the allocation of future de
jure political power. Since de facto power, because of the nature of the collective action
problem, is intrinsically transitory and diﬃcult to wield, political institutions are often
crucial in creating a source of durable political power. This makes it very attractive
for groups to use their de facto political power to change political institutions so as to
modify the distribution of future political power in their favor.
9 The Theory in Action
We now consider two examples that demonstrate our theory of institutions in action.
Like the examples discussed in section 7, these examples contain all the elements of our
theory laid out in a skeletal way in section 1.2. They show the role of political power in
determining economic institutions, they demonstrate the diﬀerent factors, both de facto
and de jure, that determine political power, and they illustrate how de facto political
power is often used to change political institutions in order to influenced the future
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distribution of de jure political power.
9.1 Rise of Constitutional Monarchy and Economic Growth in Early Modern
Europe
Our first example is the rise of constitutional monarchy in Europe. In the medieval period
most European nations were governed by hereditary monarchies. However, as the feudal
world changed, various groups struggled to gain political rights and reduce the autocratic
powers of monarchies. In England, this process began as early as 1215 when King John
was forced by his barons to sign the Magna Carta, a document which increased the
powers of the barons, introduced the concept of equality before the law, and forced
subsequent kings to consult with them. Many other European nations also developed
‘parliaments’ which kings could summon to discuss taxation or warfare (see Graves, 2001,
Ertman, 1997). Nevertheless, the movement towards limited, constitutional monarchy
was not linear or simple. Indeed, in France, certainly from the beginning of Louis XIV’s
reign in 1638, a more powerful absolutist monarchy appeared with very few controls.
Indeed the feudal French parliaments, the Estates General, were not summoned between
1614 and 1788, just before the Revolution.
In England, the Tudor monarchs, particularly Henry VIII and then Elizabeth I,
followed by the first Stuart kings, James I and Charles I, also attempted to build an
absolutist monarchy. They failed, however, mostly because of Parliament, which blocked
attempts to concentrate power. The constitutional outcome in England was settled by
the Civil War from 1642-1651 and the Glorious Revolution in 1688. In the first of these
conflicts the forces of Parliament defeated those loyal to Charles I and the king was
beheaded. In 1660 the monarchy was restored when Charles II became king, but his
brother James II was deposed in 1688 and Parliament invited William of Orange to
become king.
Other places in Europe, particularly the Netherlands, saw similar developments to
those in England. Under the Dukes of Burgundy, the Netherlands had won a considerable
amount of political and economic freedom, particularly under the Grand Privilege of
1477 which gave the States General of the Burgundian Netherlands the right to gather
on their own initiative and curbed the right of the ruler to raise taxes. However, the
Netherlands were inherited by the Hapsburgs through marriage, and by 1493 Maximilian
of Hapsburg had reversed the Grand Privilege. After 1552, war with France increased the
Hapsburgs’ fiscal needs and led them to impose a large tax burden on the Netherlands,
already a prosperous agricultural and mercantile area. Growing fiscal and religious
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resentment in 1572 led to a series of uprisings against the Hapsburgs, mostly orchestrated
by commercial interests. These culminated in the War of Independence which was finally
won in 1648.
While England and the Netherlands were developing limited constitutional govern-
ments, Spain and Portugal were moving in the same direction as France, towards greater
absolutism. Davis (1973a, p. 66) notes [in Castille] “the king ruled subject only to weak
constitutional restraints. In the first decades of the sixteenth century the crown had
reduced the pretensions of the Castillian nobility and towns, so that the representative
body, the Cortes, could obstruct but not in the last resort prevent royal tax raising.”
These diﬀerential institutional trajectories were of enormous consequence. Nether-
lands and England moved ahead economically of the rest of Europe precisely because
they developed limited, constitutional government. This form of government led to se-
cure property rights, a favorable investment climate and had rapid multiplier eﬀects on
other economic institutions, particularly financial markets (see, e.g., North and Wein-
gast, 1989, de Vries and van der Woude, 1997). While the Netherlands and Britain
prospered, France was convulsed by the French Revolution, and by the nineteenth cen-
tury Spain and Portugal were impoverished backward nations. How can we account for
these diverging paths in the early modern period? Why did England and the Netherlands
develop limited constitutional rule, while France, Spain and Portugal did not?
We proposed an explanation in Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002b) related
to the diﬀerential responses of these countries to the opportunities of ‘Atlantic trade’,
that is, overseas trade and colonial activity unleashed by the discovery of the New
World and the rounding of the Cape of Good Hope at the end of the fifteenth century.
All five nations engaged in Atlantic trade, but they did so in diﬀerent ways, with very
diﬀerent implications for the organization of society, political institutions and subsequent
economic growth.
In England “most trade was carried on by individuals and small partnerships, and
not by the Company of Merchant Adventurers, the Levant Company ... or others of their
kind” (Davis, 1973b, p. 41). At least by 1600 there was quite free entry into the English
merchant class. The same was true in the Netherlands. In contrast, Cameron (1993, p.
127) describes the Portuguese situation as follows: “The spice trade in the East Indies
of the Portuguese Empire was a crown monopoly; the Portuguese navy doubled as a
merchant fleet, and all spices had to be sold through the Casa da India (India House) in
Lisbon ... no commerce existed between Portugal and the East except that organized and
controlled by the state.” In Spain, similarly, colonial trade was a monopoly of the Crown
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of Castille, which they delegated to the Casa de Contratacio´n (House of Trade) in Seville.
This merchants guild was closely monitored by the government (Parry, 1966, Ch 2). The
main aim of these regulations was to make sure that all of the gold and silver from the
Americas flowed back to Spain, creating a source of direct tax revenues for the crown.
As a result, Latin American colonies were forbidden to buy manufactured goods from
anywhere other than Spain, and all exports and imports had to pass through controlled
channels. For example, until the Bourbon reforms of the mid eighteenth century, nothing
could be exported directly from Buenos Aires, and if somebody produced anything for
export on the Pampas, it had to be carried over the Andes and exported from Lima in
Peru!
The source of the diﬀerences in the organization of trade, in turn, reflected the
diﬀerent political institutions of these countries. At the time, the granting of trade
monopolies was a key fiscal instrument to raise revenues; the more powerful monarchs
could increase their revenues by granting trade monopolies or by directly controlling
overseas trade, while weaker monarchs could not. At the turn of the fifteenth century,
the crown was much stronger in France, Spain and Portugal than in Britain and the
Netherlands, and this was the most important factor in the diﬀerences in the organization
of overseas trade. In fact, when both Tudor and Stuart monarchs attempted to create
monopolies similar to those in Spain and Portugal, this was successfully blocked by
the English Parliament (see, for example, Hill, 1969). Consequently, as world trade
expanded in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, it enriched merchants engaged
in overseas trade in England and the Netherlands, but the crown and groups allied
with it in France, Spain and Portugal. In England and the Netherlands, but not in
France, Spain and Portugal, a new class of merchants (and gentry in England) arose
with interests directly opposed to those of the Stuarts and the Hapsburgs, and this
group was to play a central part in subsequent political changes.
In the case of the Netherlands, de Vries and van der Woude (1997) argue that “urban
economic interests ultimately believed it advantageous to escape the Hapsburg imperial
framework” (p. 369), and that it was “the traditional pillars of the maritime economy
... that supported and strengthened the young Republic in its hour of need” (p. 366).
Moreover, in the case of Amsterdam, “[Hapsburgs’] opponents included most of the
city’s international merchants ... [I]n 1578 a new Amsterdam city council threw the
city’s lot in with the Prince of Orange ... among the merchants returning from ...
exile were [those whose families] and several generations of their descendents would
long dominate the city” (1997, p. 365). The expansion of world trade enriched and
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expanded precisely those groups within Dutch society most opposed to Hapsburg rule.
Israel (1995, pp. 241-242) writes: “From 1590, there was a dramatic improvement in
the Republic’s economic circumstances. Commerce and shipping expanded enormously,
as did the towns. As a result, the financial power of the states rapidly grew, and it
was possible to improve the army vastly, both qualitatively, and quantitatively, within
a short space of time. The army increased from 20,000 men in 1588 to 32,000 by 1595,
and its artillery, methods of transportation, and training were transformed” (see also
Israel, 1989, Chapter 3). By 1629, the Dutch were able to field an army of 77,000 men,
50% larger than the Spanish army of Flanders (Israel, 1995, p. 507). As a consequence
of the Dutch revolt, the Netherlands developed a republican form of government closely
attuned to mercantile interests. De Vries and van der Woude (1997, p. 587) describe
the new political elite following the Dutch Revolt as: “6 to 8% of urban households with
incomes in excess of 1,000 guilders per year. This was the grote burgerij from whom was
drawn the political and commercial leadership of the country. Here we find, first and
foremost, the merchants,” and point out how merchants dominated the governments of
Leiden, Rotterdam and the cities in two largest states, Zeeland and Holland.
In England, the Civil War and Glorious Revolution coincided with the great ex-
pansion of English mercantile groups into the Atlantic. The East India Company was
founded in 1600 as the culmination of a series of eﬀorts to develop trade routes with
Asia. The 1620s saw the great expansion of tobacco cultivation in Virginia. This was
shortly followed by the development of the highly profitable English sugar colonies in the
Caribbean. Finally, in the 1650s the English began to take over the Atlantic slave trade.
Both the Civil War and the Glorious Revolution were at root battles over the rights
and prerogatives of the monarchy. In both cases new merchant interests predominantly
sided with those in the gentry demanding restrictions on the powers of the monarchy in
order to protect their property and commerce.
The majority of merchants trading with the Americas and in Asia supported the
Parliament during the Civil War. Brunton and Pennington (1954, p. 62) also note “in
the country as a whole there was probably a preponderance of Parliamentarian feeling
among merchants.” Detailed analyses of the initial members of the Long Parliament in
1640 show that a significant majority of merchants supported the Parliamentarian cause
(see Brenner, 1973, 1993, Keeler, 1954, and Brunton and Pennington, 1954). Members
of the Commons from the City of London (the main center of mercantile activity), as
well as many non-London commercial constituencies, such as Southampton, Newcastle
and Liverpool, supported the Parliament against the King. These men included both
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professional merchants and aristocrats who invested in colonizing the Americas. These
new merchants also provided the financial support needed by the Parliament in the
diﬃcult early days of the war. They became the customs farmers for the new regime
and therefore advanced tens of thousands of pounds that were essential in building up
the army (Brenner, 1973, p. 82).
Pincus (1998, 2001, 2002) further documents the critical role of mercantile interests in
the Glorious Revolution. He concludes (2002, p. 34) “England’s merchant community
actively supported William’s plan for invasion, and provided a key financial prop to
the regime in the critical early months.” He notes that James II favored the East India
Company and granted various monopoly privileges, alienating the merchant class. Thus,
“no wonder the merchant community poured money into William of Orange’s coﬀers in
1688.” (Pincus, 2002, pp. 32-33).
The changes in the distribution of political power, political institutions and thus
economic institutions that took place in England and the Netherlands had no counter-
parts in countries with relatively absolutist institutions, like Spain and Portugal, where
the crown was able to closely control the expansion of trade. In these countries it was
the monarchy and groups allied with it that were the main beneficiaries of the early
profits from Atlantic trade, and groups favoring political and economic change did not
become strong enough to induce such change. As a result, only in the Netherlands and
England did constitutional rule emerge, and only in these two countries were property
rights secure. As a result it was these same two countries that prospered.
Why could the monarchies of Spain and Portugal not negotiate a more eﬃcient set of
institutions? Alternatively why did the Stuart monarchs in England have to be beheaded
or forced from power before better economic institutions could emerge?
It seems quite clear that a change to a more eﬃcient set of institutions in Spain and
Portugal would not have been possible under the auspices of the absolutist state, and a
reduction in the power of the state was certainly inimical to the interest of the crown.
In the case of England, Hill (1961a) argues directly that the reason that the Tudor
and Stuart monarchs were not in favor of eﬃcient economic institutions is because they
feared that this would undermine their political power. He notes:
“in general the oﬃcial attitude to industrial advance was hostile, or at
best indiﬀerent. It was suspicious of social change and social mobility, the
rapid enrichment of capitalists, afraid of the fluctuations of the market and of
unemployment, of vagabondage, and social unrest ... the Elizabethan codes
aimed at stabilizing the existing class structure, the location of industry and
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the flow of labor supply by granting privileges and by putting hindrances in
the way of the mobility and the freedom of contract.”
The account so far explains why a change in the balance of (de facto) political power
in England and the Netherlands led to a set of economic institutions favoring the in-
terests of merchants. But in fact much more happened during the seventeenth century;
an entirely new set of political institutions, constitutional regimes, restricting the power
of the monarchy, were introduced. The reason why the merchants and the gentry in
England (and the merchants in the Netherlands) used their newfound powers for po-
litical reform illustrates the dynamics of political power emphasized by our theoretical
framework.
For example in the case of England, although in 1688 the Parliament might have
been strong, it could not be sure that this power would endure. Indeed, the ability to
solve the collective action problem and wield de facto power is intrinsically transitory.
For instance, the Parliament vanquished James II with the help of a Dutch army, after
which they invited William of Orange to take the throne. But how could they anticipate
whether or not William would try to assert the absolutist prerogatives that James II
had demanded?
The way to make transitory power permanent is to embody it into the rules of the
game which is exactly what the English Parliament did after 1688. The changes in
institutions after 1688 had large and important eﬀects. For instance, in the eighteenth
century the English monarchy was able to borrow huge amounts of money because the
fiscal control of Parliament guaranteed that it would not default (see Brewer, 1988,
Stasavage, 2003). This borrowing has been seen as crucial to the success of the English
war machine. Moreover, with the Parliament in control of fiscal policy, the crown was
never able to raise money through arbitrary taxation and not able any more to grant
monopoly rights in exchange for money–an issue which had previously been a constant
source of friction between the English crown and Parliament. Similarly, after 1688,
the greater security of property rights in England led to a huge expansion of financial
institutions and markets (Neal, 1990), which, North and Weingast (1989) argue, laid the
institutional foundations for the Industrial Revolution.
Of course the English crown was not without some residual power and might have
attempted to mount a coup against the Parliament to change political institutions back
in its favor. This certainly happened in some places, such as in France after 1849 when
Louis Napoleon mounted a successful coup to restore absolutist privileges lost in 1848.
Nevertheless, changes in political institutions altered the nature of the status quo in
71
significant ways, and therefore, influenced the future distribution of de jure political
power. Political institutions are not cast stone, and they can change, but they still
create a source of political power more durable than mere de facto power.
9.2 Summary
The emergence of constitutional rule in some societies of early modern Europe therefore
provides a nice example of how economic institutions, which shape economic outcomes,
are determined by political power, which is in turn determined by political institutions
and the distribution of resources in society. The Netherlands and England prospered in
this period because they had good economic institutions, particularly secure property
rights and well developed financial markets. They had these economic institutions be-
cause their governments were controlled by groups with a strong vested interest in such
economic institutions. These groups wielded political power because of the structure of
political institutions, i.e., they received de jure power in the Netherlands after the Dutch
Revolt and in England after the Civil War and Glorious Revolution.
Moving one step back, we see that political institutions allocated more de jure po-
litical power to commercial interests in England and the Netherlands than in France,
Spain and Portugal because of major changes in political institutions during the 1600s.
These changes took place because commercial interests in England and the Netherlands
acquired significant de facto political power as a result of their improving economic for-
tunes, itself a consequence of the interaction of Atlantic trade and the organization of
overseas trade in these countries. Crucially for our framework, these commercial inter-
ests used their de facto power to reform (or revolutionize) political institutions so as to
acquire de jure political power and solidify their gains.
These events, therefore, illustrate the various elements of our theoretical framework.
In particular, they show how it is useful to think of political institutions and the distribu-
tion of economic resources as the state variables of the dynamic system, which determine
the distribution of political power, and via this channel, economic institutions and eco-
nomic outcomes. Political institutions and the distribution of economic resources are,
themselves, endogenous, determined by political power and economic institutions, as
exemplified by the fact that the distribution of economic resources changed significantly
during the sixteenth century as a result of the new economic opportunities presented by
the rise of Atlantic trade, and these changes were crucially influenced by the existing
economic institutions (the organization of overseas trade). Furthermore, the change in
the balance of political power led to the changes in political institutions through the
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English Civil War, the Glorious Revolution and the Dutch Revolt.
9.3 Rise of Electoral Democracy in Britain
Our second example, based on Acemoglu and Robinson (2000a, 2001, 2003), is the rise
of mass democracy. In the early nineteenth century, European countries were run by
small elites. Most had elected legislatures, often descendents of medieval parliaments,
but the franchise was highly restricted to males with relatively large amounts of assets,
incomes or wealth. However, as the century and the Industrial Revolution progressed,
this political monopoly was challenged by the disenfranchised who engaged in collective
action to force political change.
In response to these developments, the elites responded in three ways. First by using
the military to repress the opposition, as in the responses to the revolutions of 1848.
Second, by making concessions to buy oﬀ opposition–this is the standard explanation
for the beginnings of the welfare state in Germany under Bismarck. Finally, if neither
repression nor concessions were attractive or eﬀective, elites expanded the franchise and
gave political power to the previously disenfranchised–they created the precedents of
modern democracy.
The history of the rise of democracy in Britain is in many ways representative of
the experiences of many other European countries. The first important move towards
democracy in Britain came with the First Reform Act of 1832. This act removed many
of the worst inequities under the old electoral system, in particular the ‘rotten boroughs’
where several members of parliament were elected by very few voters. The 1832 reform
also established the right to vote based uniformly on the basis of property and income.
The reform was passed in the context of rising popular discontent at the existing political
status quo in Britain.
By the 1820s the Industrial Revolution was well under way and the decade prior to
1832 saw continual rioting and popular unrest. Notable were the Luddite Riots from
1811-1816, the Spa Fields Riots of 1816, the Peterloo Massacre in 1819, and the Swing
Riots of 1830 (see Stevenson, 1979, for an overview). Another catalyst for the reforms
was the July revolution of 1830 in Paris. Much of this was led and orchestrated by
the new middle-class groups who were being created by the spread of industry and the
rapid expansion of the British economy. For example, under the pre-1832 system neither
Manchester nor Sheﬃeld had any members of the House of Commons.
There is little dissent amongst historians that the motive for the 1832 Reform was
to avoid social disturbances (e.g., Lang, 1999, p. 36). The 1832 Reform Act increased
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the total electorate from 492,700 to 806,000, which represented about 14.5% of the adult
male population. Yet, the majority of British people (the remaining 23 million) could not
vote, and the elite still had considerable scope for patronage, since 123 constituencies
still contained less than 1,000 voters. There is also evidence of continued corruption
and intimidation of voters until the Ballot Act of 1872 and the Corrupt and Illegal
Practices Act of 1883. The Reform Act therefore did not create mass democracy, but
rather was designed as a strategic concession. In presenting his electoral reform to the
British Parliament in 1831, the Prime Minister Earl Grey was well aware that this was
a measure necessary to prevent a likely revolution. He argued:
“The Principal of my reform is to prevent the necessity for revolution
... reforming to preserve and not to overthrow.” (quoted in Evans, 1983, p.
212).
Unsurprisingly therefore, the issue of parliamentary reform was still very much alive
after 1832, and it was taken up centrally by the Chartist movement. But as Lee (1994,
p. 137) notes “The House of Commons was largely hostile to reform because, at this
stage, it saw no need for it.” This had changed by 1867, largely due to a juxtaposition
of factors, including the sharp business cycle downturn that caused significant economic
hardship and the increased threat of violence. Also significant was the founding of the
National Reform Union in 1864 and the Reform League in 1865, and the Hyde Park
riots of July 1866 provided the most immediate catalyst.
Lang (1999, p. 75) sums up his discussion by saying “The Hyde Park aﬀair, coupled
with other violent outbursts, helped to underscore the idea that it would be better
to keep the goodwill of the respectable workers than to alienate them.” Reform was
initially proposed by the Liberal Prime Minister Russell in 1866 but was defeated by
the Conservatives and dissident MP’s. As a result Russell’s government fell, and the
Conservatives formed a minority administration with Lord Derby as their leader in the
House of Lords, and Disraeli in charge of the House of Commons. It was Disraeli who
then constructed a coalition to pass the Second Reform Act in 1867. As a result of
these reforms, the total electorate was expanded from 1.36 million to 2.48 million, and
working class voters became the majority in all urban constituencies. The electorate
was doubled again by the Third Reform Act of 1884, which extended the same voting
regulations that already existed in the boroughs (urban constituencies) to the counties
(electoral constituencies in the rural areas). The Redistribution Act of 1885 removed
many remaining inequalities in the distribution of seats and from this point on Britain
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only had single member electoral constituencies (previously many constituencies had
elected two members–the two candidates who gained the most votes). After 1884
about 60% of adult males were enfranchised. Once again social disorder appears to have
been an important factor behind the 1884 act.
In Britain, the Reform Acts of 1867-1884 were a turning point in the history of the
British state. Economic institutions also began to change. In 1871 Gladstone reformed
the civil service, opening it to public examination, making it meritocratic. Liberal and
Conservative governments introduced a considerable amount of labor market legislation,
fundamentally changing the nature of industrial relations in favor of workers. During
1906-1914, the Liberal Party, under the leadership of Asquith and Lloyd George, intro-
duced the modern redistributive state into Britain, including health and unemployment
insurance, government financed pensions, minimum wages, and a commitment to redis-
tributive taxation. As a result of the fiscal changes, taxes as a proportion of National
Product more than doubled in the 30 years following 1870, and then doubled again. In
the meantime, the progressivity of the tax system also increased (Lindert, 2004). Fi-
nally, there is also a consensus amongst economic historians that inequality in Britain
fell after the 1870’s (see Lindert, 2000, 2004)
Meanwhile, the education system, which was either primarily for the elite or run
by religious denominations during most of the nineteenth century, was opened up to
the masses; the Education Act of 1870 committed the government to the systematic
provision of universal education for the first time, and this was made free in 1891. The
school leaving age was set at 11 in 1893, then in 1899, it increased to 12 and special
provisions for the children of needy families were introduced (Mitch, 1993). As a result of
these changes, the proportion of 10-year olds enrolled in school that stood at 40 percent
in 1870 increased to 100 percent in 1900 (Ringer, 1979, p. 207). Finally, a further act in
1902 led to a large expansion in the resources for schools and introduced the grammar
schools which subsequently became the foundation of secondary education in Britain.
Following the Great War, the Representation of the People Act of 1918 gave the
vote to all adult males over the age of 21, and women over the wage of 30 who were
ratepayers or married to ratepayers. Ultimately, all women received the vote on the same
terms as men in 1928. The measures of 1918 were negotiated during the war and may
reflect to some extent a quid pro quo between the government and the working classes
who were needed to fight and produce munitions. Nevertheless, Garrard (2002, p. 69)
notes “most assumed that, if the system was to survive and ‘contentment and stability
prevail’, universal citizenship could not be denied men, perceived to have suﬀered so
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much and to have noticed Russia’s Revolution.”
Overall, the picture which emerges from British political history is clear. Beginning
in 1832, when Britain was governed by the relatively rich, primarily rural aristocracy,
a series of strategic concessions were made over an 86 year period to adult men. These
concessions were aimed at incorporating the previously disenfranchised into politics since
the alternative was seen to be social unrest, chaos and possibly revolution. The conces-
sions were gradual because in 1832, social peace could be purchased by buying oﬀ the
middle classes. Moreover, the eﬀect of the concessions was diluted by the specific details
of political institutions, particularly the continuing unrepresentative nature of the House
of Lords. Although challenged during the 1832 reforms, the House of Lords provided
an important bulwark for the wealthy against the potential of radical reforms emanat-
ing from a democratized House of Commons. Later, as the working classes reorganized
through the Chartist movement and later through trade unions, further concessions had
to be made. The Great War and the fallout from it sealed the final oﬀer of full democ-
racy. Though the pressure of the disenfranchised played less of a role in some reforms
than others, and other factors undoubtedly played a role, the threat of social disorder
was the main driving force behind the creation of democracy in Britain.
The story of the rise of mass democracy that emerges from the British evidence is
one where economic and social changes connected with industrialization (for example,
rising inequality) and urbanization increased the de facto power of the disenfranchised.
In response, they demanded political rights, in particular changes in the political insti-
tutions which would allocate future political power to them. These changes in political
institutions were, in many ways, the direct cause of the changes in economic institutions,
in particular, in the labor market, in government policy, in the educational system, with
major distributional implications, including the fall in inequality.
Why did elites in Britain create a democracy? Our discussion makes it clear that
democracy did not emerge from the voluntary acts of an enlightened elite. Democracy
was, in many ways, forced on the elite, because of the threat of revolution. Nevertheless,
democratization was not the only potential outcome in the face of pressure from disen-
franchised, or even in the face of the threat of revolution. Many other countries faced
the same pressures and political elites decided to repress the disenfranchised rather than
make concessions to them. This happened with regularity in Europe in the nineteenth
century, though by the turn of the twentieth century most had accepted that democracy
was inevitable. Repression lasted much longer as the favorite response of elites in Latin
America, and it is still the preferred option for current political elites in China or Burma.
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The problem with repression is that it is costly. Faced with demands for democracy
political elites face a trade-oﬀ. If they grant democracy, then they lose power over
policy and face the prospect of, possibly radical, redistribution. On the other hand,
repression risks destroying assets and wealth. In the urbanized environment of nineteenth
century Europe (Britain was 70% urbanized at the time of the Second Reform Act), the
disenfranchised masses were relatively well organized and therefore diﬃcult to repress.
Moreover, industrialization had led to an economy based on physical, and increasing
human, capital. Such assets are easily destroyed by repression and conflict, making
repression an increasingly costly option for elites. In contrast, in predominantly agrarian
societies like many parts of Latin America earlier in the century or current-day Burma,
physical and human are relatively unimportant and repression is easier and cheaper.
Moreover, not only is repression cheaper in such environments, democracy is potentially
much worse for the elites because of the prospect of radical land reform. Since physical
capital is much harder to redistribute, elites in Western Europe found the prospect of
democracy much less threatening.
Faced with the threat of revolt and social chaos, political elites may also attempt
to avoid giving away their political power by making concessions, such as income re-
distribution or other pro-poor policies. The problem with concessions however is their
credibility, particularly when de facto power is transitory. For example, if a crisis, such
as a harvest failure or business cycle recession creates a window of opportunity to solve
the collective action problem and challenge the existing regime, the elites would like to
respond with the promise of concessions. Yet windows of opportunity disappear and
it is diﬃcult to sustain collective action which entails people protesting in the streets
and being away from their families and jobs. Thus collective action quickly dissipates
and once it does so, the government has an incentive to renege on its promise of conces-
sions. The promise of concessions, which people know to be non-credible is unlikely to
defuse collective action. Hence, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000a, 2001, 2003) argue that
democratization occurred as a way of making credible commitments to the disenfran-
chised. Democratization was a credible commitment to future redistribution, because
it reallocated de jure political power away from the elites to the masses. In democracy,
the poorer segments of the society would be more powerful and could vote, in other
words, could use their de jure political power, to implement economic institutions and
policies consistent with their interests. Therefore, democratization was a way of trans-
forming the transitory de facto power of the disenfranchised poor into more durable de
jure political power.
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9.4 Summary
The emergence of mass democracy is another example illustrating our theory of insti-
tutions. Into the nineteenth century, economic institutions, particularly in the labor
market, disadvantaged the poor. For example, trade unions were illegal and as late as
the 1850 in Britain workers trying to organize a union could be shipped to the penal
colony in Tasmania, Australia. The poor could not alter economic institutions in their
favor because, being disenfranchised, they had little de jure political power and also
limited de facto power,the because they were often unable to solve their collective action
problems.
However, changes in the structure of society and the economy during the early nine-
teenth century altered the balance of political power, in particular making the exercise
of de facto power by the politically disenfranchised much easier (Tilly, 1995, and Tarrow,
1998, document the changing qualitative nature of collective action over this period).
The rise in the de facto political power of the poor necessitated a change in political
institutions in their favor to defuse the threat of revolution. This was to tilt the fu-
ture allocation of de jure political power, and consequently to ensure future economic
institutions and policies consistent with their interests.
Whether or not increases in de facto power translated into democracy depended on a
number of factors, in particular how diﬃcult and costly it was for elites to use repression
to counter the increase in the power of the masses, and how costly the prospect of
democracy was. The changes in political institutions that occurred with democracy
had profound implications for economic institutions. In the case of Britain, the period
after the Second Reform Act of 1867 led the British state to commit itself to providing
universal education for the first time and it also led to radical changes in labor market
institutions allowing trade unions to form legally for the first time and increasing the
bargaining power of labor. Hence economic institutions changed radically in favor of
those newly endowed with de jure political power, mostly the relatively poor. This is
in fact a relatively general result of democratization. Democracy enfranchises the poor,
and the poor are able to use democracy to tilt economic institutions and the distribution
of income in society in their favor (Li, Squire and Zou, 1998, Rodrik, 1999).
The emergence of democracy in the nineteenth-century Europe therefore also illus-
trates the workings of our theoretical framework. In particular, it shows how political
institutions determine economic institutions and policies, and thus the distribution of
resources, and it shows how political institutions change, especially in response to an im-
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balance of de facto political power, as a credible way of influencing the future allocation
of de jure political power.
10 Future Avenues
In this chapter we have proposed a framework for thinking about why some countries
grow faster and are richer than others. We emphasized, following North and Thomas
(1973), that most economic growth theory focuses only on proximate determinants.
Although this body of work has been useful in helping us understand the mechanics of
growth, it fails to provide a satisfactory account of why some countries grow while others
do not. A major research goal must now be to get beyond the neoclassical growth model
and its extensions, and search for the deeper causes, i.e., the fundamental determinants
of growth.
We argued that the available evidence is consistent with the view that whether or not
a society grows depends on how its economy is organized–on its economic institutions.
We then proposed the outlines of a theory of institutions and illustrated it through a
series of historical examples. We emphasized that a theory of why diﬀerent countries
have diﬀerent economic institutions must be based on politics, on the structure of po-
litical power, and the nature of political institutions. Much remains to be done. First,
the framework we outlined was largely verbal rather than mathematical, and thus, by
its very nature, not fully specified. Constructing formal models incorporating and ex-
tending these ideas is the most important task ahead. Although some of our past work
(e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000a, 2001, Acemoglu 2003b) formalizes parts of this
framework, the full model has not been developed yet.
There are also many important issues left out of our framework, which appear to oﬀer
fruitful areas for future research. First, though we know that institutions, both economic
and political, persist for long periods of time, often centuries (and sometimes millennia),
we do not as yet have a satisfactory understanding of the mechanisms through which
institutions persist.
Second, and closely related, although institutions do generally persist, sometimes
they change. We have important examples of societies which have radically changed
their political and economic institutions. Some do so for internal reasons, such as France
after the Revolution of 1789, and some do because of external pressures such as Japan
after the Meiji restoration or Russia after the Crimean War.
The important point here is that both institutional persistence and institutional
change are equilibrium outcomes. Approaches positing institutional persistence as a
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matter of fact, and then thinking of institutional changes as unusual events will not
be satisfactory. Both phenomena have to be analyzed as part of the same dynamic
equilibrium framework.
One type of institutional change, consistent with the examples we discussed in this
chapter, takes place when those who benefit from the existing set of institutions are
forced to accept change, either because they are the losers in a process of fighting or
because of the threat of internal revolution (another possibility is that they might accept
change because of the threat of external invasion). However, institutional change can
also take place because the set of economic institutions that is optimal for a particular
group with political power may vary over time as the state variables in the system and
economic opportunities evolve. One example may be the end of slavery in the British
Empire and another may be the economic and political changes introduced by Mikhail
Gorbachev in the Soviet Union in the 1980s. We need more research on the dynamic
mechanisms at work.
Finally, it is important to understand the role of policy and interventions in chang-
ing the institutional equilibrium. Though social science research is of intrinsic interest,
one would hope that a convincing fundamental theory of comparative growth based on
institutions would lead to policy conclusions that would help us improve the institutions
and thus the lives and welfare of people in poor countries. It should be obvious that,
at the moment, we are a long way from being in a position to draw such conclusions.
In a world where political choices are made rationally and are endogenous to the struc-
ture of institutions, which are themselves ultimately endogenous, giving policy advice
is a conceptually complex issue (see Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Thaicharoen,
2003, for reflections on this issue). Recognizing our current ignorance on this topic in
no way diminishes its importance, and its role as the Holy Grail of political economy
research, however. And we believe that better and empirically more realistic theoretical
frameworks in the future will take us closer to this Holy Grail.
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Figure 2
Latitude and log GDP per capita 1995
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GDP per capita in North and South Korea, 1950-98
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Figure 4
Urbanization in 1995 and log GDP per capita in 1995
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Figure 5
Urbanization in 1500 and log GDP per capita in 
1995, among former European colonies 
.
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Figure 6
Log population density in 1500 and log GDP per 
capita in 1995, among former European colonies
.
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Figure 7
Urbanization in 1000 and 1500, among non-colonies
Non-Colonies
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Figure 8
Urbanization in 1000 and 1500, among former European 
colonies
Former Colonies
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Figure 9
Urbanization in 1500 and log GDP per capita in 1995, 
among non-colonies
Non-Colonies
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Figure 10
Evolution of urbanization among former European 
colonies
Urbanization in excolonies with low and high urbanization in 1500
(averages weighted within each group by population in 1500)
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Figure 11
Evolution of industrial production per capita among 
former European colonies
Industrial Production Per Capita, UK in 1900 = 100
(from Bairoch)
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Figure 12
Urbanization in 1500 and average protection against risk of 
expropriation 1985-95
.
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Figure 13
Log population density in 1500 and average protection 
against risk of expropriation 1985-95 
.
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Figure 14
Log mortality of potential European settlers
and average protection against risk of expropriation 1985-95
.
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Figure 15
Log mortality of potential European settlers and log GDP 
per capita in 1995 
.
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Figure 16
Log population density in 1500 and log GDP per 
capita in 1995, among former British colonies
Just British Colonies
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Figure 17
Log population density in 1500 and log GDP per 
capita in 1995, among former European colonies with 
current population less than 5% of European descent
Former Colonies, Percent European Descent in 1975 <5%
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